

[The following selections are from a monastic textbook entitled *An Explanation of the Science of Logic, included in the Advanced Path of Reasoning, a Section from the "Key to the Logic Machine," a Presentation of the Collected Topics which Clarifies the Meaning of the Great Scriptures on Valid Perception (Tsad- ma'i gzhung-don 'byed-pa'i bsdus-grva'i rnam-par bshad-pa rigs-lam 'phrul gyi lde'u-mig las rigs-lam che-ba rtags-rigs kyi skor)*. This text was written by Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901), who in his day held the position of Tutor to the Dalai Lama; ff. 1A-2A and 10A-10B.]

Our first selection discusses the importance of learning how to reason well:

,BLA MA DANG MGON PO 'JAM DPAL DBYANGS LA PHYAG 'TSAL LO,

I bow down to my Lama and my Protector, the glorious Gentle Voice (Manjushri).

,DIR RIGS PA'I SGO 'BYED BSDUS GRVA'I RNAM PAR BSHAD PA RIGS LAM
'PHRUL GYI LDE MIG LAS RIGS LAM CHE BA RTAGS RIGS KYI RNAM
BZHAG BSHAD PA LA,

Here begins *An Explanation of the Science of Logic, included in the Advanced Path of Reasoning, a Section from the "Key to the Logic Machine," a Presentation of the Collected Topics* which opens the door to the art of reasoning.

,TSAD MAR GYUR PA 'GRO LA PHAN BZHED PA, STON PA BDE GSHEGS
SKYOB LA PHYAG 'TSAL LO, , ZHES PA'I GZHUNG 'DIS BDAG CAG GI
STON PA PHYI ROL PA'I STON PA LAS KHYAD PAR DU 'PHAGS PA'I STON
PA TSAD MAR BSTAN TE, 'GRO LA PHAN BZHED PA, ZHES PAS, RANG
RGYU BSAM SBYOR PHUN TSOGS LAS 'KHRUNGS PA'I PHYIR ZHES
BSTAN,

Let us consider first the quotation [from Master Dharmakirti's *Commentary on Valid Perception*] which says:

I bow down to the Teacher, the One Who has Gone to Bliss,
To the Protector, the one who is totally correct,
Who undertakes to benefit every living being.

The purpose of these lines is to show that our Teacher is a teacher who is totally correct (Tib: *tsad-ma*; Skt: *pramana*), and a teacher who is infinitely superior to

those of non-Buddhist traditions. The reason here is that he "undertakes to benefit every living being"; which is to say, he was created by a very special cause—consummate thoughts and actions.

'O NA RANG RE'I STON PA LA YON TAN JI LTA BU MNGA' ZHE NA, BDE GSHEGS SKYOB ZHES PAS, RANG DON SPANGS PA PHUN TSOGS DANG , GZHAN DON RTOGS PA PHUN TSOGS GNYIS MNGA' BAS NA SKYOB PA BLA NA MED PAR BSTAN PA YIN TE, RNAM 'GREL LAS, RTOG PA'I DRA BA RNAM BSAL ZHING , , ZHES GSUNGS PA'I PHYIR,

"Just what," one may ask, "are the extraordinary qualities which our own Teacher possesses?" This is answered in the words "the One Who has Gone to Bliss, the Protector." Our Teacher possesses both a consummate form of all that will benefit himself—that is, he has eliminated every negative thing within himself; and he possesses as well a consummate form of all that will benefit others—which is to say, he has realized all knowable things. As such he is said to be a Protector surpassed by none other; for as the *Commentary [on Valid Perception]* says, "He has smashed the web of ideas, and..."

DE LTAR RANG RE'I STON PA NI STON PA TSAD MA, DE'I LUNG RTOGS KYI BSTAN PA NI BSTAN PA RNAM DAG, DE'I LUNG LAS GSUNG PA'I TSAD MA MNGON RJES GNYIS NI 'JUG BYA'I TSAD MA RNAM DAG,

And so it is that our Teacher is a teacher who is totally correct; and that his teaching is a teaching which is totally pure; and that the correct perceptions described in his words—that is, the pair of direct and deductive perception—are totally pure and correct methods of perception for us to use.

RGYU BSAM SBYOR PHUN TSOGS NI NYAMS SU BLANG BYA'I LAM RNAM DAG TU RTOG GE'I TSIG DON BRGYAD KYI SGO NAS SGRUB PAR MDZAD, DES NA SGRUB NGAG DANG , SUN 'BYIN GYI RNAM BZHAG LA MKHAS PA'I SGO NAS RGYAL BA'I BSTAN PA 'DZIN PA DE NI, BSTAN 'DZIN GYI GTZO BO YIN TE, RIGS GTER LAS, DE LTA SGRUB DANG SUN 'BYIN GYI , RIGS PA'I GZHUNG LUGS GANG GIS SHES, , MKHAS PA DE NI RDZOGS PA YI , SANGS RGYAS KYI NI BSTAN PA 'DZIN , , ZHES GSUNGS PA'I PHYIR,

The causes that create the Buddha are consummate thoughts and actions. Proving that these constitute a totally pure path that we should practice is accomplished by using the eight different forms of logic. As such there is but one main way of keeping the teachings of the victorious Buddha safe in the

world, and this is to become a master of the logical forms used to prove some things and to disprove others. As the *Goldmine of Reasoning* [by the Sakya Pandita, Kunga Gyeltsen (1182-1251)] says,

Suppose a person comes to understand
The scriptural tradition for how to reason:
This art of proving or disproving things.
A master like this is a person who keeps
The teachings of the totally enlightened
Buddhas safe here in the world.

[The second selection is a very famous quotation from scripture which is memorized by every young monk who begins the geshe course in a Tibetan monastery. It describes one of the ultimate reasons for studying the art of reasoning:]

MDO LAS, GANG ZAG GIS GANG ZAG GI TSOD GZUNG BAR MI BYA STE,
NYAMS PAR GYUR TE RE, ZHES RANG LA MI SNANG BA TZAM GYIS
GZHAN LA YON TAN DE LTA BU MED CES 'CHAD MI RIGS PA'I DON
STON PA LA, RNAM 'GREL LAS, TSAD MA RNAMS NI MI 'JUG PA, MED LA
MI 'JUG 'BRAS BU CAN, ZHES SOGS KYIS BSTAN,

There is a sutra where it says,

No person should ever judge another; those who try will fall.

The point of these words is to show us how wrong it is for us to say that someone else lacks any particular good quality, only because it does not appear to us that they do. This same point is made in the *Commentary* with lines such as the following:

In a case where valid perception has yet
To engage in the object, the result obtained
Is that they don't: they didn't engage.

[The selection here is from the monastic textbook entitled An Explanation of the Science of Logic, included in the Advanced Path of Reasoning, a Section from the "Key to the Logic Machine," a Presentation of the Collected Topics which Clarifies the Meaning of the Great Scriptures on Valid Perception (Tsad-ma'i gzhung-don 'byed-pa'i bsdus-grva'i rnam-par bshad-pa rigs-lam 'phrul gyi lde'u-mig las rigs-lam che-ba rtags-rigs kyi skor). The text was written by Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901), who in his day held the position of Tutor to the Dalai Lama.]

[Please note that indented statements are those made by the opponent. The logical statements in brackets are understood responses that are often left out of the text. ff. 5A-8B]

, GNYIS PA GZHI GRUB KYI RNAM BZHAG BSHAD PA LA, DGAG BZHAG SPONG GSUM LAS,

Here is the second section, an outline of existence. Here we will refute the position of our opponents, present our own position, and then finally disprove their rebuttal.

DANG PO LA, KHA CIG NA RE, GZHI GRUB NA, RTAG PA YIN PAS KHYAB ZER NA,

Here is the first. Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If a thing can be established as existing, then it is necessarily an unchanging thing.

BUM PA CHOS CAN, RTAG PA YIN PAR THAL, GZHI GRUB PA'I PHYIR, KHYAB PA KHAS,

Consider then a water pitcher.
So is it an unchanging thing?
Because it can be established as existing.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, TSAD MAS GRUB PA YIN PA'I

PHYIR, KHYAB STE, TSAD MAS GRUB PA, GZHI GRUB KYI MTSAN NYID
YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say a water pitcher can be established as
existing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a water pitcher can be
established as existing.]

It is so [something that can be established as existing],
Because it is established through a valid perception.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

It does necessarily follow,
Because "that which is established through a valid perception" is the definition of
a thing which can be established as existing.

RTZA BAR 'DOD NA, BUM PA CHOS CAN, RTAG PA MA YIN PAR THAL, MI
RTAG PA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree to your original statement: the water pitcher is an
unchanging thing.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement, [that a water pitcher is an
unchanging thing].

Consider the water pitcher.
It isn't so, that it's something unchanging;
Because it's a thing that changes.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, SKAD CIG MA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say it's a thing that changes.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that it's a thing that changes].

Consider this same thing.
It is so [something which changes],
Because it's something that lasts only for a moment.

KHYAB STE, SKAD CIG MA, MI RTAG PA'I MTSAN NYID YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

It does necessarily follow,

Because "anything that lasts only for a moment" is the definition of a changing thing.

DER THAL, DON BYED NUS PA, DNGOS PO'I MTSAN NYID, 'JIG PA, 'DUS BYAS KYI MTSAN NYID, SKYES PA, BYAS PA'I MTSAN NYID YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not true that this is the definition of a changing thing.]

It is so the definition of a changing thing,

Because "anything that performs a function" is the definition of a working thing; "anything that stops" is the definition of a produced thing, and "anything that starts" is the definition of a made thing.

KHA CIG NA RE, YOD PA YIN NA, DNGOS PO YIN PAS KHYAB ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If a thing is something which exists,
Then it must always be a working thing.

'DUS MA BYAS KYI NAM MKHA' CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DE'I PHYIR,
KHYAB PA KHAS,

Consider empty space, the space which is unproduced.

So is it then [a working thing]?

Because it is [something which exists].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, TSAD MAS DMIGS PA YIN PA'I
PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that it's something which exists.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that it is something which exists].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [something which exists],

Because it can be established as existing through a valid perception.

MA KHYAB NA, DE LA KHYAB PA YOD PAR THAL, TSAD MAS DMIGS PA,
YOD PA'I MTSAN NYID YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

It does so [necessarily follow,]

Because "anything which can be perceived through a valid perception" is the
definition of an existing thing.

RTZA BAR 'DOD NA, DE CHOS CAN, DNGOS PO MA YIN PAR THAL,
DNGOS MED YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree to your original statement: empty space is a working thing.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

Consider this same thing.

Isn't it so, that it is not a working thing?

Because it is a thing which has no work.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DON BYED NUS STONG YIN
PA'I PHYIR,

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that it is a thing which has no work].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [a thing which has no work],

Because it is void of the quality of performing a function.

KHYAB STE, DON BYED NUS STONG DNGOS MED KYI MTSAN NYID, MI 'JIG PA 'DUS MA BYAS KYI MTSAN NYID, MA SKYES PA, MA BYAS PA'I MTSAN NYID YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

It does necessarily follow,

Because "anything which is void of the quality of performing a function" is the definition of a thing which has no work; and "anything which never stops" is the definition of a thing which was not produced; and "anything which never starts" is the definition of a thing which was not made.



KHA CIG NA RE, SHES BYA YIN NA, YIN PA SRID PA'I SHES BYA YIN PAS KHYAB ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Knowable things must always be knowable things which can be.

KA BUM GNYIS CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DE'I PHYIR,

Consider the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.

So are they [a knowable thing which can be]?

Because they are [knowable things].

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, YOD PA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that they are knowable things.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that they are knowable things].

They are so [knowable things],

Because they are things which exist.

KHYAB STE, SHES BYA, YOD PA, GZHAL BYA, GZHI GRUB RNAMS DON GCIG YIN PA'I PHYIR,

It does necessarily follow,

Because "knowable thing," "something which exists," "something which can be apprehended," and "something which can be established as existing" are all different names for the same thing.

RTZA BAR 'DOD NA, DE CHOS CAN, YIN PA SRID PA'I SHES BYA MA YIN PAR THAL, YIN PA MI SRID PA'I SHES BYA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree to your original statement: the two of a pillar and a water pitcher are a knowable thing which can be.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

Consider these same things.

It isn't so, that they are a knowable thing which can be,
Because they are knowable things which cannot be.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, SHES BYA YIN PA GANG ZHIG KHYOD KYI YIN PA MED PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that they are knowable things which cannot be.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say they are knowable things which cannot be].

Consider these same things.

They are so [knowable things which cannot be],
Because (1) they are knowable things and (2) there doesn't exist a thing which is them.

GNYIS PA SLA, DANG PO MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, SHES BYA YIN PAR THAL, GCIG DANG THA DAD GANG RUNG YIN PA'I PHYIR,

The second point we just mentioned is easy to accept; now suppose you say that the first is not correct.

Consider these same things.

They are so [knowable things],

Because they are either one thing, or separate things, or both one thing and separate things.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, THA DAD YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that they are either one thing, or separate things, or both one thing and separate things.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that they are either one thing, or separate things, or both one thing and separate things].

Consider these same things.

They are so [either one thing, or separate things, or both one thing and separate things,]

Because they are separate things.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, PHAN TSUN THA DAD YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that they are separate things.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that they are separate things].

Consider these same things.

They are so [separate things],

Because they are separate in such a way that to be one always means that you cannot be the other.

MA GRUB NA, KA BUM GNYIS PHAN TSUN THA DAD YIN PAR THAL, KA BA BUM PA DANG THA DAD, BUM PA KA BA DANG THA DAD YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that they are separate in a way that to be one always means that you cannot be the other.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that they are separate in such a way that to be one always means that you cannot be the other].

It is so true, that the two of a pillar and a water pitcher are separate in such a way that to be one always means that you cannot be the other,

Because to be a pillar is not to be a water pitcher, and to be a water pitcher is not to be a pillar.

DANG PO MA GRUB NA, KA BA CHOS CAN, BUM PA DANG THA DAD YIN PAR THAL, YOD PA GANG ZHIG BUM PA DANG GCIG MA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that to be a pillar is not to be a water pitcher.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct to say the first, [that to be a pillar is not to be a water pitcher.]

Consider a pillar.

It is so true, that to be it is not to be a water pitcher,

Because (1) it exists and (2) it is not automatically a water pitcher.

KHA CIG NA RE, YOD PA YIN NA, YIN PA MI SRID PA'I YOD PA YIN PAS KHYAB ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something exists,

It must always be something which exists and which cannot be.

DNGOS PO CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DE'I PHYIR, KHYAB PA KHAS,

Consider a working thing.

So is it then something which exists and which cannot be?

Because it is [a thing which exists].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, RTAG DNGOS GANG RUNG YIN PA'I PHYIR TE, DNGOS PO YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is a thing which exists.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing is a thing which exists].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [a thing which exists],

Because it's either an unchanging thing, a working thing, or both;

Because it's a working thing.

RTZA BAR 'DOD NA, DE CHOS CAN, YIN PA MI SRID PA'I YOD PA MA YIN
PAR THAL, YIN PA SRID PA'I YOD PA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree to your original statement: a working thing is
something which exists and which cannot be.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

Consider this same thing.

It isn't so, that it's something which exists and which cannot be,

Because it's something which exists and which can be.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, YOD PA GANG ZHIG BEM SHES
LDAN MIN 'DU BYED GSUM KHYOD YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that it's something which exists and which
can be.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that it's something which exists and
which can be].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [something which exists and which can be],

Because (1) it is something which exists; and (2) the three of matter, mind, and
those active things which are neither mind nor matter are all things which
are different kinds of it.

PHYI MA MA GRUB NA, BEM SHES LDAN MIN 'DU BYED GSUM CHOS
CAN, DNGOS PO YIN PAR THAL, YOD PA GANG ZHIG RTAG PA MA YIN
PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to make the latter statement: that the three of matter, mind, and those active things which are neither mind nor matter are all things which are different kinds of working things.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct to make the latter statement: [the statement that the three of matter, mind, and those active things which are neither mind nor matter are all things which are different kinds of working things].

Consider the three of matter, mind, and those active things which are neither mind nor matter.

They are so working things,

Because they are (1) things which exist and (2) are not things which are unchanging.

KHA CIG NA RE, DNGOS PO MA YIN NA, RTAG PA YIN PAS KHYAB ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

zIf something is not a working thing, it must always be an unchanging thing.

RI BONG RVA CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DE'I PHYIR, KHYAB PA KHAS,

Consider a rabbit's horns.

So are they [an unchanging thing]?

Because they are [something which is not a working thing].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, RTAG DNGOS GANG RUNG MA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a rabbit's horns are not a working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [that a rabbit's horns are not a working thing.]

Consider this same thing.

They are so [not a working thing],

Because they are neither an unchanging thing, nor a working thing, nor both.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, YOD PA MA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that they are neither an unchanging thing,
nor a working thing, nor both.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that they are neither an unchanging thing, nor a working thing, nor both].

Consider this same thing.

They are so [neither an unchanging thing, nor a working thing, nor both].

Because they are not something which exists.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, MED PA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that they are not something which exists.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that they are not something which exists].

Consider this same thing.

They are so [not something which exists],

Because they are something which does not exist.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, TSAD MAS MA GRUB PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say they are something which does not exist.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that they are something which does not exist].

They are so [something which does not exist],
Because their existence cannot be established by a valid perception.

RTZA BAR 'DOD NA, DE CHOS CAN, RTAG PA MA YIN PAR THAL, YOD PA
MA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree to your original statement: a rabbit's horns are an
unchanging thing.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement, [that a rabbit's horns are an
unchanging thing.]

Consider this same thing.
It's not so, that they are an unchanging thing,
Because they are not something which exists.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, KHYOD KYI NGO BO MED PA'I
PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that they are not something which exists.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that they are not something which
exists.]

Consider this same thing.
They are so [not something which exists],
Because they have no existing nature.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, RANG GI NGO BO 'DZIN PA MA
YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a rabbit's horns have no existing nature.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a rabbit's horns have no existing
nature].

Consider this same thing.
They are so [something that has no existing nature],
Because they are not something which holds any existing nature.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, CHOS MA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a rabbit's horns are not something which holds any existing nature.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a rabbit's horns are not something which holds any existing nature].

Consider this same thing.

They are so [not something which holds any existing nature],
Because they are not a thing (a *dharma*).

KHYAB STE, RANG GI NGO BO 'DZIN PA, CHOS KYI MTSAN NYID YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow, because "anything which holds an existing nature" is the definition of a "thing" (or *dharma*).

[*This definition by the way reflects an etymological explanation in the Sanskrit, since the verbal root for "to hold" is dh_, which is also the root for dharma.*]

KHA CIG NA RE, CHOS YIN NA, DGAG GZHI CAN GYI CHOS MA YIN PAS
KHYAB ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something is a thing, it can never be a thing which is such that there is a place where it doesn't exist.

BUM PA CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DE'I PHYIR, KHYAB PA KHAS,

Consider a water pitcher.

So is it then [not a thing which is such that there is a place where it doesn't exist]?
Because it is [a thing].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, 'DUS BYAS KYI CHOS YIN PA'I
PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a water pitcher is a thing.]

Suppose you say that's it's not correct [to say that a water pitcher is a thing].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [a thing],

Because it is a thing which is produced.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DNGOS PO YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a water pitcher is a thing which is
produced.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a water pitcher is a thing which
is produced].

It is so [a thing which is produced],

Because it is a working thing.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DON BYED NUS PA YIN PA'I
PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a water pitcher is a working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a water pitcher is a working
thing].

It is so [a working thing],

Because it is a thing which performs a function.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, LTO LDIR ZHABS ZHUM CHU
SKYOR GYI DON BYED NUS PA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a water pitcher is a thing which performs a function.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a water pitcher is a thing which performs a function].

It is so [a thing which performs a function],
Because it is an object with a rounded body and a supporting base which performs the function of holding water.

DER THAL, BUM PA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a water pitcher is an object with a rounded body and a supporting base which performs the function of holding water.]

It is so [an object with a rounded body and a supporting base which performs the function of holding water],
Because it's a water pitcher.

KHYAB STE, DE BUM PA'I MTSAN NYID YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow, because that is the classical definition of a water pitcher.

RTZA BAR 'DOD NA, DE CHOS CAN, DGAG GZHI CAN GYI CHOS YIN PAR THAL, KHYOD KYI DGAG GZHI YOD PA GANG ZHIG KHYOD CHOS YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree with your original statement: a water pitcher is not a thing which is such that there is a place where it doesn't exist.]

Suppose you agree with our original statement, [that a water pitcher is not a thing which is such that there is a place where it doesn't exist.]

It is so [a thing which is such that there is a place where it doesn't exist],

Because (1) there does exist a place where it doesn't exist, and (2) it is a thing.

GNYSIS PA SLA, DANG PO MA GRUB NA, BUM PA'I DGAG GZHI YOD PAR
THAL, BUM PA MED PA'I SA PHYOGS YOD PA'I PHYIR,

The second point we just mentioned is easy to accept; now suppose you say that
the first is not correct.

It is so true [that there exists a place where a water pitcher doesn't exist],
Because there exists a location where there is no water pitcher.

MA GRUB NA, DER THAL, BDAG MED YIN NA, BUM PA YOD PAS MA
KHYAB PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that there is a location where there is no
water pitcher.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that there is a location where there is
no water pitcher].

It is so true [that there is a location where there is no water pitcher],
Because if any particular thing is such that it has no self-nature, then it is not
always the case that a water pitcher has to be there.

KHA CIG NA RE, RANG MTSAN YIN NA, SHES PA YIN PAS KHYAB ZER
NA,

Someone may come and make the following claim:

If something is a thing which exists in and of itself, then it must
always be mental.

BEM SHES GNYIS CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DE'I PHYIR, KHYAB PA KHAS,

Consider the two of matter and mind.

So are they then [something mental]?

Because they are [things which exist in and of themselves].

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, MNGON SUM GYI SNANG
NGOR GRUB PA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that the two of matter and mind are things
which exist in and of themselves.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the two of matter and mind are
things which exist in and of themselves].

Consider these same things.

They are so [things which exist in and of themselves],

Because they can be established as existing to the state of mind of direct, valid
perception.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, MNGON SUM GYI SNANG YUL
YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that the two of matter and mind can be
established as existing to the state of mind of a direct, valid
perception.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the two of matter and mind can
be established as existing to the state of mind of a direct, valid perception.]

Consider these same things.

They can so [be established as existing to the state of mind of a direct, valid
perception],

Because they are objects which present themselves to direct, valid perception.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DNGOS PO YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that they are objects which present
themselves to direct, valid perception.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that they are objects which present
themselves to direct, valid perception.]

They are so [objects which present themselves to direct, valid perception],
Because they are working things.

KHYAB STE, MNGON SUM GYI SNANG YUL DANG , DNGOS PO DON GCIG, RTOG PA'I SNANG YUL DANG , RTAG PA DON GCIG YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow, because the terms "object which presents itself to direct, valid perception" and "working thing" are synonyms. And the terms "object which presents itself to conceptual thought" and "unchanging thing" are also synonyms.

RTZA BAR 'DOD NA, DE CHOS CAN, SHES PA MA YIN PAR THAL, LDAN MIN 'DU BYED YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree with your original statement: the two of matter and mind are something mental.]

Suppose you agree with our original statement, [that the two of matter and mind are something mental.]

Consider these same things.

It's not so, [that they are something mental],

Because they are active things which are neither mind nor matter.

KHYAB STE, BEM SHES LDAN MIN 'DU BYED GSUM PO NANG PHAN TSUN 'GAL BA KHO NA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow, because these three—matter, mind, and active things which are neither mind nor matter—are always mutually exclusive.

KHA CIG NA RE, LKOG GYUR YIN NA, SPYI MTSAN YIN PAS KHYAB ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something belongs to hidden reality, it must always be an idealization.

GSER BUM CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DE'I PHYIR, KHYAB PA KHAS,

Consider a pitcher made of gold.

So is it then [an idealization]?

Because it is [something that belongs to hidden reality].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does follow.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, RANG 'DZIN RTOG PAS LKOG
TU GYUR PA'I TSUL GYIS RTOGS PAR BYA BA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a pitcher made of gold belongs to hidden reality.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a pitcher made of gold belongs to hidden reality].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [something which belongs to hidden reality],

Because it is something which can be perceived by a conceptual state of mind as something which is hidden.

KHYAB STE, DE DE'I MTSAN NYID YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow,

Because that is the definition of what it is [to be something which belongs to hidden reality].

GONG DU MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, RANG 'DZIN RTOG PAS LKOG
TU GYUR PA'I TSUL GYIS RTOGS PAR BYA BA YIN PAR THAL, RANG 'DZIN
RTOG PA'I GZHAL BYA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[Your point above is not correct: it's not correct to say that a pitcher made of gold is something which can be perceived by a conceptual state of mind as something which is hidden.]

Suppose you say that our point above is not correct; [that is, that it's not correct to say that a pitcher made of gold is something which can be perceived by a conceptual state of mind as something which is hidden].

Consider this same thing.

It is so something which can be perceived by a conceptual state of mind as something which is hidden,

Because it is something which can be apprehended by the particular conceptual state of mind which is grasping it.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, GZHI GRUB PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a vase made of gold is something which can be apprehended by the particular conceptual state of mind which is grasping it.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a vase made of gold is something which can be apprehended by the particular conceptual state of mind which is grasping it.]

Consider this same thing.

It is so [something which can be apprehended by the particular conceptual state of mind which is grasping it],

Because it is something which can be established as existing.

RTZA BAR 'DOD NA, DE CHOS CAN, SPYI MTSAN MA YIN PAR THAL,
RANG MTSAN YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree with your original statement: a pitcher made of gold is an idealization.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement, [that a pitcher made of gold is an idealization].

It isn't so, [that it is an idealization],

Because it exists in and of itself.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DNGOS PO YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a pitcher made of gold exists in and of itself.]

Suppose say that it's not correct [to say that a pitcher made of gold exists in and of itself.]

It does so [exist in and of itself],
Because it is a working thing.

KHYAB STE, DNGOS PO, RANG MTSAN, DON DAM BDEN PA RNAMS DON GCIG, RTAG PA, SPYI MTSAN, KUN RDZOB BDEN PA RNAMS DON GCIG YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow, because "working thing," "thing which exists in and of itself," and "thing which is ultimately real" are all different names for the same thing. And "unchanging thing," "idealization," and "thing which is deceptively real" are also all different names for the same thing.

KHA CIG NA RE, MNGON GYUR YIN NA, LKOG GYUR MA YIN PAS KHYAB ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something belongs to obvious reality, then it can never belong to hidden reality.

KA BA CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DE'I PHYIR,

Consider a pillar.
So is it then [something that could never belong to hidden reality]?

Because it is [something which belongs to obvious reality].

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, MNGON SUM GYI TSAD MAS
DNGOS SU RTOGS PAR BYA BA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a pillar is something which belongs to
obvious reality.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a pillar is something which
belongs to obvious reality].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [something which belongs to obvious reality],

Because it's a thing which can be perceived directly by direct, valid perception.

KHYAB STE, MNGON SUM GYI TSAD MAS DNGOS SU RTOGS PAR BYA BA,
MNGON GYUR GYI MTSAN NYID YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow, because "anything which can be perceived directly
by direct, valid perception" is the definition of a thing which belongs to
obvious reality.

GONG DU MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, MNGON SUM GYI TSAD MAS
DNGOS SU RTOGS PAR BYA BA YIN PAR THAL, DNGOS PO YIN PA'I
PHYIR,

[Your point above is not correct: it's not correct to say that a pillar is
a thing which can be perceived directly by direct, valid
perception.]

Suppose you say that our point above is not correct; [suppose you say that a
pillar is not a thing which can be perceived directly by direct, valid
perception].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [a thing which can be perceived directly by direct, valid perception],

Because it is a working thing.

RTZA BAR 'DOD NA, DE CHOS CAN, LKOG GYUR YIN PAR THAL, RANG
'DZIN RTOG PAS LKOG TU GYUR PA'I TSUL GYIS RTOGS PAR BYA BA YIN
PA'I PHYIR, RTAGS BSGRUB ZIN,

[Then I agree with your original statement: a pillar is something
that could never belong to hidden reality.]

Suppose you agree with our original statement.

Consider this same thing.

It is so something which can belong to hidden reality,
Because it is something which can be perceived by a conceptual state of mind as
something which is hidden.

The reason has already been proven.

GNYSIS PA RANG GI LUGS LA, GZHI GRUB KYI MTSAN NYID YOD DE,
TSAD MAS GRUB PA DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

Here is the second major part, where we present our own position.

There does exist a definition for "that which can be established as existing,"
Because "that which can be established by a valid perception" is the definition.

GZHI GRUB LA DBYE NA GNYIS YOD DE, RTAG PA DANG , DNGOS PO
GNYSIS YOD PA'I PHYIR,

There do exist two different categories for "that which can be established as
existing,"

Because there exist the categories of "unchanging things" and "working things."

RTAG PA'I MTSAN NYID YOD DE, CHOS DANG SKAD CIG MA MA YIN PA'I
GZHI MTHUN PA DE, RTAG PA'I MTSAN NYID YIN PA'I PHYIR,

There does exist a definition for "unchanging thing,"

Because "one object which is both a thing and which is not such that it only lasts
for a moment" is the definition of an "unchanging thing."

RTAG PA LA DBYE NA GNYIS YOD DE, YIN PA SRID PA'I RTAG PA DANG ,
YIN PA MI SRID PA'I RTAG PA GNYIS YOD PA'I PHYIR,

Things which are unchanging can be divided into two different types:
unchanging things which can be, and unchanging things which cannot be.

YIN PA SRID PA'I RTAG PA BZHAG TU YOD DE, SHES BYA DE DE YIN PA'I
PHYIR, YIN PA MI SRID PA'I RTAG PA BZHAG TU YOD DE, RTAG DNGOS
GNYIS DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

There does exist something which is an unchanging thing that can be,
Because "knowable things" is it.

There does exist something which is an unchanging thing that cannot be,
Because "the two of unchanging things and changing things" is it.

DNGOS PO'I MTSAN NYID YOD DE, DON BYED NUS PA DE DE YIN PA'I
PHYIR,

There does exist a definition of "working thing,"
Because "anything which performs a function" is the definition.

DNGOS PO LA DBYE NA GSUM YOD DE, BEM SHES LDAN MIN 'DU BYED
GSUM YOD PA'I PHYIR,

There exist three different kinds of working things, for there are the three of
matter, mind, and active things which are neither matter nor mind.

BEM PO'I MTSAN NYID YOD DE, RDUL DU GRUB PA DE DE YIN PA'I
PHYIR,

There does exist a definition for "matter,"
Because "something made of tiny physical particles" is the definition.

BEM PO LA DBYE NA GNYIS YOD DE, PHYI'I BEM PO DANG , NANG GI
BEM PO GNYIS YOD PA'I PHYIR,

There are two different kinds of matter, for there are the two of outer physical
matter and inner physical matter.

PHYI'I BEM PO'I MTSAN NYID YOD DE, SKYES BU'I RGYUD KYI MA BSDUS
PA'I RDUL DU GRUB PA DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

There does exist a definition for "outer physical matter," for "something which is made of tiny physical particles, but which is not subsumed by the awareness of a being" is the definition.

MTSAN GZHI YOD DE, BUM PA, KA BA, SA CHU ME RLUNG BZHI PO DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

There do exist classical examples of outer physical matter, for a water pitcher, a pillar, and the four elements of earth, water, fire, and wind are just such examples.

NANG GI BEM PO'I MTSAN NYID YOD DE, SKYES BU'I RGYUD KYI BSDUS PA'IRDUL DU GRUB PA DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

There does exist a definition for "inner physical matter," for "something which is made of tiny physical particles, and which is subsumed by the awareness of a being" is the definition.

MTSAN GZHI YOD DE, ZAG BCAS NYER LEN GYI GZUGS PHUNG DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

There does exist a classical example of inner physical matter, for the impure heap of physical form is just such an example.

SHES PA'I MTSAN NYID YOD DE, GSAL ZHING RIG PA DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

There does exist a definition for "something mental," because "anything which is both invisible and aware" is the definition.

MTSAN GZHI YOD DE, MIG SHES DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

There does exist a classical example of something mental, because visual consciousness is just such an example.

LDAN MIN 'DU BYED KYI MTSAN NYID YOD DE, BEM SHES GANG RUNG MA YIN PA'I 'DUS BYAS DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

There does exist a definition for an "active thing which is neither matter nor

mind," because "any produced thing which is neither matter nor mind" is the definition.

MTSAN GZHI YOD DE, DNGOS PO DANG , MI RTAG PA DANG , RTA DANG BA GLANG SOGS GANG ZAG RNAMS DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

There do exist classical examples of active things which are neither matter nor mind, because "working thing" and "changing thing" and persons such as horses or cattle are just such examples.

YANG GZHI GRUB LA DBYE NA, GNYIS YOD DE, GCIG DANG THA DAD GNYIS YOD PA'I PHYIR,

There does exist another way of dividing up those things which can be established as existing, because they can be divided into two, and these are the two of being either one thing or separate things.

GCIG GI MTSAN NYID YOD DE, SO SO BA MA YIN PA'I CHOS DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

There does exist a definition of "being one thing," because "being a thing which is not individual things" is the definition.

MTSAN GZHI YOD DE, SHES BYA, RTAG PA, DNGOS PO RNAMS RE RE NAS DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

There do exist classical examples of being one, because there are the examples of "all knowable things," "all unchanging things," and "all working things"—each considered as a separate unit.

THA DAD KYI MTSAN NYID YOD DE, SO SO BA'I CHOS DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

There does exist a definition for "being separate things," because "being individual things" is the definition.

MTSAN GZHI YOD DE, RTAG DNGOS GNYIS, MTSAN MTSON GNYIS, KA BUM GNYIS, GSER BUM DANG ZANGS BUM GNYIS RNAMS DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

There do exist classical examples of things that are separate things, because there are "the two of unchanging things and changing things," and "the two of definitions and the things they define," and "the two of a pillar and a water pitcher," and "the two of a pitcher made of gold, and a pitcher made of brass."

YANG SHES BYA LA DBYE NA GNYIS SU YOD DE, RANG MTSAN DANG SPYI MTSAN GNYIS YOD PA'I PHYIR,

There does exist another way of dividing up knowable things, because they can be divided into two, and these are the two of things which exist in and of themselves, and conceptualizations.

RANG MTSAN GYI MTSAN NYID YOD DE, SGRA RTOG GIS BTAGS TZAM MA YIN PAR RANG GI MTSAN NYID KYI GRUB PA'I CHOS DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

There does exist a definition for a "thing which exists in and of itself," because a "thing which exists of its own accord, and which is not just something made up with a name or an idea" is the definition.

SPYI MTSAN GYI MTSAN NYID YOD DE, SGRA RTOG GIS BTAGS PA TZAM YIN GYI RANG MTSAN DU MA GRUB PA DE, SPYI MTSAN GYI MTSAN NYID YIN PA'I PHYIR,

There does exist a definition for a "conceptualization," because "anything which is just something that is made up with a name or an idea, and which has no existence in and of itself" is the definition of a conceptualization.

DE BZHIN DU DON DAM PAR DON BYED NUS PA'I CHOS, DON DAM BDEN PA'I MTSAN NYID,

Just so, the definition of a "thing which is ultimately real" is "anything which is, ultimately, able to perform a function."

DON DAM PAR DON BYED MI NUS PA'I CHOS, KUN RDZOB BDEN PA'I MTSAN NYID YIN NO,

The definition of a "thing which is deceptively real" is "any thing which is, ultimately, unable to perform a function."

RTZOD PA SPONG BA LA KHO NA RE, BLO'I YUL DU BYA RUNG , SHES BYA'I MTSAN NYID MA YIN PAR THAL, YIN PA SRID PA'I BLO'I YUL DU BYA RUNG , YIN PA SRID PA'I SHES BYA'I MTSAN NYID MA YIN PA'I PHYIR, ZER NA

Here is the third major part, where we disprove any rebuttal.

Suppose someone comes and claims,

It isn't so, that "anything which can be an object of the mind" is the definition of a "knowable thing,"

Because "anything which can be the object of a mind that can be" is not the definition of a "knowable thing that can be."

MA KHYAB STE, GZHI GRUB NA YIN PA SRID PA'I BLO'I YUL DU BYA RUNG DANG , YIN PA MI SRID PA'I BLO'I YUL DU BYA RUNG GNYIS KA YIN PAS KHYAB PA'I PHYIR TE, GZHI GRUB NA, YIN PA SRID PA'I RNAM MKHYEN DANG , YIN PA MI SRID PA'I RNAM MKHYEN GNYIS KA'I GZHAL BYA YIN PAS KHYAB PA'I PHYIR,

But it doesn't necessarily follow,

Because if something can be established as existing, it is always both (1) something which can be the object of a mind that can be; and (2) something which can be the object of a mind that cannot be.

And this is true because anything which can be established as existing is always something which can be apprehended by both that omniscience which is, and by that omniscience which is not.

YANG KHO NA RE, MI RTAG PA DANG , RTAG PA'I GZHI MTHUN YOD PAR THAL, SGRA MI RTAG PA DANG , RTAG PA GNYIS KA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

Suppose another person comes, and makes another claim:

It is so, that there exists one object which is both changing and unchanging,

Because sound is both changing and unchanging.

DER THAL, SGRA MI RTAG PA YIN PA GANG ZHIG RTAG PA YIN PA'I PHYIR ZER NA, SDOMS RTAGS MA GRUB KYI LAN 'DEBS SO, ,

[It's not correct to say that sounds are both changing and unchanging.]

It is so, [that sounds are both changing and unchanging],
Because what you call "sound" is something which is both (1)
changing and (2) unchanging.

At this point you should use the following answer: "Your combined reason is not correct."

YANG KHA CIG 'DUS MA BYAS KYI NAM MKHA' CHOS CAN, DON DAM
BDEN PA YIN PAR THAL, MNGON SUM GYI SNANG NGOR GRUB PA YIN
PA'I PHYIR,

Someone may come and make the following claim:

Consider empty space—space which is unproduced.
So does it then belong to ultimate reality?
Because it can be established as existing to the state of mind of
direct, valid perception.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, MNGON SUM GYI SNANG
NGOR YOD PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that it can be established as existing to the state of mind of
direct, valid perception.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that it can be
established as existing to the state of mind of direct, valid
perception].
Consider this same thing.
It can so [be established as existing to the state of mind of direct,
valid perception],
Because it exists to the state of mind of direct, valid perception.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, MNGON SUM GYI NGES NGOR
YOD PA'I PHYIR NA MA KHYAB,

[It's not correct to say that empty space exists to the state of mind of direct, valid
perception.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that empty space exists
to the state of mind of direct, valid perception.]

Consider this same thing.

It does so [exist to the state of mind of direct, valid perception],

Because it exists to the ascertainment of direct, valid perception.

RTAGS GRUB STE, MNGON SUM GYI GZHAL BYA YIN PA'I PHYIR TE,
RNAM MKHYEN GYI GZHAL BYA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that empty space exists to the ascertainment of direct, valid
perception.]

It is correct [to say that it exists to the ascertainment of direct, valid
perception],

Because it's something that is apprehended by direct, valid
perception;

And this is true because it is something apprehended by
omniscience.

GONG DU 'DOD NA, DE CHOS CAN, DON DAM BDEN PA MA YIN PAR
THAL, KUN RDZOB BDEN PA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

And suppose you say that our point above is correct.

Consider this same thing.

It isn't so, that empty space belongs to ultimate reality,

Because it belongs to deceptive reality.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, RTAG PA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that empty space belongs to deceptive reality.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that empty space
belongs to deceptive reality.]

It is so [something that belongs to deceptive reality],

Because it is unchanging.

**Formal logic subject:
The subject, the quality to be proven,
and the quality denied in a logical statement**

,GNYIS PA DBYE BA BSHAD PA LA, RTAGS YANG DAG BSHAD PA, DE'I LDOG PHYOGS RTAGS LTAR SNANG BSHAD PA GNYIS, DANG PO LA, RTAGS YANG DAG GI LTOS GZHI DANG , MTSAN NYID, DBYE BA BSHAD PA DANG GSUM,

Here is the second part, which is an explanation of the different kinds of reasons. Here there are two divisions: an explanation of correct reasons, and an explanation of the opposite; that is, incorrect reasons. The first comes in three steps of its own—explanations of the pivotal objects for a correct reason; of the definition of a correct reason; and of the different types of correct reasons.

DANG PO LA, PHYOGS CHOS KYI LTOS GZHI SHES 'DOD CHOS CAN BSHAD PA DANG , KHYAB PA'I LTOS GZHI MTHUN PHYOGS DANG MI MTHUN PHYOGS BSHAD PA GNYIS,

The first of these has two further sections: an explanation of the subject (the basis of the opponent's doubt)—which is the pivotal object in the relationship between the subject and the reason; and an explanation of the pivotal object in the necessary relationships between the quality to be proven and the reason—that is, the groups of similar cases and dissimilar cases.

DANG PO LA, SHES 'DOD CHOS CAN GYI MTSAN NYID, MTSAN GZHI, ZHAR LA BSGRUB BYA'I CHOS NGOS BZUNG BA DANG GSUM,

We will present the first of these in three parts: the definition of the subject, a classical example of a subject, and then—as an incidental point—identifying the quality to be proven.

DANG PO LA, KHYOD BYAS PA'I RTAGS KYIS SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA'I RTZOD GZHIR BZUNG BA YANG YIN, KHYOD BYAS PAR TSAD MAS NGES NAS, KHYOD MI RTAG PA YIN MIN LA SHES 'DOD ZHUGS PA'I GANG ZAG SRID PA YANG YIN PA'I GZHI MTHUN PAR DMIGS PA, KHYOD BYAS PA'I RTAGS KYIS SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA'I SHES 'DOD CHOS CAN SKYON MED YIN PA'I MTSAN NYID,

Here is the first. The following is the definition of a "flawless subject in a proof where being made is used as a reason to prove that sounds are changing things":

It must exist as one object which combines both of the following qualities:

It must first of all be something which is considered the basis of contention in a proof where being made is used as a reason to prove that sounds are changing things.

There must also be possible a person who, once they have ascertained that it is something which is made, still entertains doubts about whether it is unchanging or not.

GNYIS PA MTSAN GZHI NI, SGRA DE DE YIN, DE 'DRA'I SHES 'DOD CHOS CAN DE YIN NA SGRA DANG GCIG YIN PAS KHYAB BO, ,

Here secondly is the classical example; and this "sounds." Anything which is this particular subject in a logical statement is necessarily one and the same as sounds themselves.

GSUM PA NI, BSGRUB BYA'I CHOS SU BZUNG BA, BSGRUB BYA'I CHOS KYI MTSAN NYID,

The third part here will have two parts of its own: identifying the quality to be proven, and the definition of the quality to be proven.

BDAG MED YIN NA, BSGRUB BYA'I CHOS YIN PAS KHYAB STE, BDAG MED YIN NA, KHYOD SGRA KHYOD DU SGRUB PA'I BSGRUB BYA'I CHOS YIN PAS KHYAB PA'I PHYIR, DES NA BSGRUB BYA'I CHOS YIN NA, CHOS YIN PAS MA KHYAB BO, ,

If something lacks a self-nature, then it can always be the quality to be proven. This is because—if something lacks a self-nature—it can always be the quality to be proven in a logical statement where you are trying to prove that sounds are it. Therefore we can say that, if something is a quality to be proven, it need not be an existing thing.

SGRA MI RTAG PAR BSGRUB PA'I BSGRUB BYA'I CHOS SU BZUNG BA, SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA'I BSGRUB BYA'I CHOS KYI MTSAN NYID,

Here is the definition of a quality to be proven in a logical proof that sounds are changing things: "Anything which can be considered the quality to be proven in a logical proof that sounds are changing things."

DE LA DBYE NA, DE SGRUB KYI DNGOS KYI BSGRUB BYA'I CHOS DANG ,
DE SGRUB KYI SHUGS KYI BSGRUB BYA'I CHOS GNYIS,

Qualities to be proven can be divided into two separate types: qualities to be proven which are explicit, and qualities to be proven which are implicit.

MTSAN NYID RIM PA BZHIN, DE SGRUB KYI DNGOS KYI BSGRUB BYA'I
CHOS SU BZUNG BA, DE SGRUB KYI DNGOS KYI BSGRUB BYA'I CHOS KYI
MTSAN NYID,

Here are their respective definitions. "Anything which can be considered the explicit quality to be proven in a logical statement" is the definition of an "explicit quality to be proven in any particular logical statement."

DE SGRUB KYI SHUGS KYI BSGRUB BYA'I CHOS SU BZUNG BA, DE SGRUB
KYI SHUGS KYI BSGRUB BYA'I CHOS KYI MTSAN NYID,

"Anything which can be considered the implicit quality to be proven in a logical statement" is the definition of an "implicit quality to be proven in any particular logical statement."

MTSAN GZHI RIM PA BZHIN, MI RTAG PA DANG PO DANG , MI RTAG PA
MA YIN PA LAS LOG PA GNYIS PA YIN,

Classical examples for these two, respectively, would be the following. An example of the first would be "a changing thing." An example of the second would be "the opposite of all that is not a changing thing."

YANG MI RTAG PA DANG SKAD CIG MA GNYIS RE RE NAS BYAS PA'I
RTAGS KYI DE SGRUB KYI DNGOS KYI BSGRUB BYA'I CHOS DANG , DE
GNYIS MA YIN PA LAS LOG PA GNYIS RE RE NAS DE SGRUB KYI SHUGS
KYI BSGRUB BYA'I CHOS YIN NO, ,

You could also say that both "a changing thing" and "something that lasts only a moment" are, each of them, explicit qualities to be proven in a logical proof

where being made is used as a reason to make the proof. The two opposites—of all that each one of them is not—would then each be an example of implicit qualities to be proven.

SGRA CHOS CAN, MI RTAG STE, BYAS PA'I PHYIR, ZHES BKOD PA'I TSE, SGRA SBYOR BA DE SGRUB KYI RTZOD GZHI, MI RTAG PA DE SGRUB KYI BSGRUB BYA'I CHOS, SGRA MI RTAG PA BSGRUB BYA, BYAS PA RTAGS YANG DAG, RTAG PA DGAG BYA'I CHOS, SGRA RTAG PA SBYOR BA DE SGRUB KYI DGAG BYAR 'JOG, DES GZHAN LA YANG RIGS 'GRE,

Let's consider now a case where we put forth the following logical statement:

Consider sounds.
They are changing things,
Because they are something which is made.

The basis of contention in this statement [—that is, the subject of the proof—] is "sounds." The quality to be proven is being a changing thing. The assertion, the idea to be proven, is that sounds are changing things. The reason is being something which is made. The quality being denied is being an unchanging thing. The idea being denied is that sounds are unchanging. You can apply this same pattern to every other logical statement.

,SGRUB BYED NI, MI RTAG PA CHOS CAN, KHYOD SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA'I DNGOS KYI BSGRUB BYA'I CHOS YIN TE, MTSAN NYID DE'I PHYIR RO, ,

Here are logical statements to prove what we've said:

Consider "being a changing thing."
It is the explicit quality to be proven in a proof that sounds are
changing things,
Because it fits the definition given above.

SKAD CIG MA CHOS CAN, SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA'I DNGOS KYI BSGRUB BYA'I CHOS MA YIN TE, DE SGRUB KYI RTAGS YANG DAG YIN PA'I PHYIR,

Consider "being a thing that only lasts a moment."
It is not an explicit quality to be proven in a [certain] proof that

sounds are changing things,
Because [in a certain proof] that sounds are unchanging things it
provides the reason in the proof.

, DRUG PA SPYI DANG BYE BRAG GI RNAM BZHAG BSHAD PA LA, DGAG
BZHAG SPONG GSUM LAS, DANG PO LA,

Here is the sixth section: a presentation of quality and characteristic. For this
presentation we will first refute the position of our opponents, then present our
own position, and then finally eliminate their rebuttal.

KHA CIG NA RE, SPYI YIN NA BYE BRAG MA YIN PAS KHYAB ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Nothing which is a general category (in the sense of being a
quality) can ever be a specific member of a category (in the sense of
being characteristic of a quality).

DNGOS PO CHOS CAN, BYE BRAG MA YIN PAR THAL, SPYI YIN PA'I
PHYIR, KHYAB PA KHAS,

Consider "working thing."
So is it never then characteristic of a quality?
Because it is a quality.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

MA GRUB NA, DNGOS PO CHOS CAN, SPYI YIN PAR THAL, KHYOD KYI
BYE BRAG YOD PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that "working thing" is a quality.]

Consider "working thing."
It is so a quality,
Because it has things which are characteristic of itself.

MA GRUB NA, DNGOS PO CHOS CAN, KHYOD KYI BYE BRAG YOD PAR
THAL, BUM PA DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that "working thing" has things which are
characteristic of itself.]

Consider "working thing."

It does so have things which are characteristic of itself,

Because a water pitcher is one.

MA GRUB NA, BUM PA CHOS CAN, KHYOD DNGOS PO'I BYE BRAG YIN
PAR THAL, KHYOD DNGOS PO YIN, KHYOD DNGOS PO DANG BDAG
GCIG TU 'BREL KHYOD MA YIN ZHING DNGOS PO YANG YIN PA'I GZHI
MTHUN PA DU MA GRUB PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a water pitcher is characteristic of "working
thing."]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a water pitcher is characteristic
of "working thing"].

Consider a water pitcher.

It is so characteristic of "working thing,"

Because (1) it is a working thing; (2) it shares a relationship with "working thing"
such that to be it is to automatically be a working thing; and (3) there exist
multiple other objects which are both not it, but still a working thing.

RTAGS GNYIS PA MA GRUB NA, BUM PA CHOS CAN, DNGOS PO DANG
BDAG GCIG 'BREL YIN PAR THAL, DNGOS PO DANG BDAG NYID GCIG
YIN PA GANG ZHIG, DNGOS PO DANG THA DAD KYANG YIN, DNGOS PO
MED NA KHYOD MED DGOS PA'I PHYIR,

[The second part of the reason you gave is not correct.]

Suppose you say that the second part of the reason we gave is not correct.

Consider a water pitcher.

It is so true, that it shares a relationship with "working thing" such that to be it is
to automatically be a working thing,

Because (1) to be it is to automatically be a working thing; (2) it is something distinct from "working thing"; and (3) if there were no working things it could not never exist either.

RTAGS DANG PO MA GRUB NA, BUM PA CHOS CAN, DNGOS PO DANG BDAG NYID GCIG YIN PAR THAL, DNGOS PO DANG RANG BZHIN GCIG YIN PA'I PHYIR,

Suppose you say that the first part of the last reason we gave is not correct.

Consider a water pitcher.

It is so, that to be a water pitcher is to automatically be a working thing,
Because to be a water pitcher is by nature to be a working thing.

RTAGS GNYIS PA MA GRUB NA, BUM PA CHOS CAN, DNGOS PO DANG THA DAD YIN PAR THAL, GZUGS YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[The second part of the reason you gave is not correct.]

Suppose you say that the second part of the reason we gave is not correct.

Consider a water pitcher.

It is so something distinct from "working thing,"
Because it is something physical.

RTAGS GSUM PA MA GRUB NA, BUM PA CHOS CAN, DNGOS PO MED NA KHYOD MED DGOS PAR THAL, DNGOS PO MED NA GANG DRAN DRAN YIN DGOS PA'I PHYIR,

[The third part of the reason you gave is not correct.]

Suppose you say that the third part of the reason we gave is not correct.

Consider a water pitcher.

It is so the case, that if there were no working things it could not never exist
either,
Because if there were no working things, then you could make up anything at all.

GONG GI RTAGS GSUM PA MA GRUB NA, BUM PA CHOS CAN, KHYOD MA YIN ZHING DNGOS PO YANG YIN PA'I GZHI MTHUN PA DU MA

GRUB PAR THAL, TZAN DAN GYI KA BA DE YANG DE YIN, SHUG PA'I KA
BA DE YANG DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[The third part of your original reason is not correct.]

Suppose you say that the third part of our original reason is not correct.

Consider a water pitcher.

There do so exist multiple other objects which are both not it, but still a working
thing,

Because a pillar of sandalwood is one, and a pillar of juniper is also one.

RTZA BAR 'DOD NA, DNGOS PO CHOS CAN, BYE BRAG YIN PAR THAL,
SHES BYA'I BYE BRAG YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree to your original statement: "working thing" is never
characteristic of a quality.]

Consider "working thing."

It is so characteristic of a quality,

Because it is characteristic of "knowable things."

MA GRUB NA, DNGOS PO CHOS CAN, SHES BYA'I BYE BRAG YIN PAR
THAL, KHYOD SHES BYA YIN, KHYOD SHES BYA DANG BDAG GCIG TU
'BREL, KHYOD MA YIN ZHING SHES BYA YANG YIN PA'I GZHI MTHUN
PA DU MA GRUB PA'I PHYIR,

[Your reason is not correct.]

Suppose you say that it is not correct [to say that "working thing" is
characteristic of "knowable things"].

Consider "working thing."

It is so characteristic of "knowable things,"

Because (1) a working thing is a knowable thing; (2) it shares a relationship with
"knowable things" such that to be it is to automatically be a knowable
thing; and (3) there exist multiple objects which are both not a working
thing, but still knowable thing.

KHA CIG NA RE, DNGOS PO'I SPYI YIN NA, DON BYED NUS PA'I SPYI YIN
PAS KHYAB ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something is a quality of which "working thing" is characteristic,
then it is always a quality of which "able to perform a function" is
characteristic.

MTSON BYA CHOS CAN, DON BYED NUS PA'I SPYI YIN PAR THAL,
DNGOS PO'I SPYI YIN PA'I PHYIR, KHYAB PA KHAS,

Consider "thing to be defined."

So is it then a quality of which "able to perform a function" is characteristic?
Because it is a quality of which "working thing" is characteristic.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

MA GRUB NA, MTSON BYA CHOS CAN, KHYOD DNGOS PO'I SPYI YIN PAR
THAL, DNGOS PO KHYOD KYI BYE BRAG YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that "thing to be defined" is a quality of which
"working thing" is characteristic.]

Consider "thing to be defined."

It is so a quality of which "working thing" is characteristic,
Because "working thing" is characteristic of it.

MA GRUB NA, DNGOS PO CHOS CAN, MTSON BYA'I BYE BRAG YIN PAR
THAL, KHYOD MTSON BYA YIN, KHYOD MTSON BYA DANG BDAG GCIG
TU 'BREL, KHYOD MA YIN ZHING MTSON BYA YANG YIN PA'I GZHI
MTHUN PA DU MA GRUB PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that "working thing" is characteristic of "thing
to be defined."]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that "working thing" is characteristic

of "thing to be defined"].

Consider "working thing."

It is so characteristic of "thing to be defined,"

Because (1) it is a thing to be defined; (2) it shares a relationship with "thing to be defined" such that to be it is to automatically be a thing to be defined; and (3) there do exist multiple other objects which are both not it and yet are still things to be defined.

RTZA BAR 'DOD NA, DON BYED NUS PA CHOS CAN, KHYOD MTSON
BYA'I BYE BRAG MA YIN PAR THAL, MTSAN NYID YIN PA'I PHYIR TE,
DNGOS PO'I MTSAN NYID YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree with your original statement: "thing to be defined" is
a quality of which "able to perform a function" is
characteristic.]

Suppose you agree with our original statement, [saying that "thing to be defined"
is a quality of which "able to perform a function" is characteristic].

It is not so, that "thing to be defined" is a quality of which "able to perform a
function" is characteristic,

Because it ["able to perform a function"] is the definition of a working thing.

KHA CIG NA RE, DNGOS PO'I SPYI YIN NA, MI RTAG PA'I SPYI YIN PAS
KHYAB ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything which is a quality of which "working thing" is
characteristic must also be a quality of which "changing thing" is
characteristic.

MI RTAG PA DANG THA DAD CHOS CAN, MI RTAG PA'I SPYI YIN PAR
THAL, DNGOS PO'I SPYI YIN PA'I PHYIR, KHYAB PA KHAS,

Consider "distinct from 'changing thing'."

So is it then a quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic?
Because it is a quality of which "working thing" is characteristic.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

MA GRUB NA, MI RTAG PA DANG THA DAD CHOS CAN, KHYOD DNGOS
PO'I SPYI YIN PAR THAL, DNGOS PO KHYOD KYI BYE BRAG YIN PA'I
PHYIR,

Suppose you say that it's incorrect to say [that "distinct from 'changing thing'" is
a quality of which "working thing" is characteristic].

Consider "distinct from 'changing thing'."
It is so a quality of which "working thing" is characteristic,
Because "working thing" is characteristic of it.

RTZA BAR 'DOD NA, MI RTAG PA DANG THA DAD CHOS CAN, MI RTAG
PA'I SPYI MA YIN PAR THAL, MI RTAG PA KHYOD KYI BYE BRAG MA YIN
PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree with your original statement: "distinct from 'changing
thing'" is a quality of which "changing thing" is
characteristic.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement, [saying that "distinct from
'changing thing'" is a quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic].

It's not so, that "distinct from 'changing thing' " is a quality of which "changing
thing" is characteristic,
Because "changing thing" is not characteristic of it.

MA GRUB NA, MI RTAG PA CHOS CAN, MI RTAG PA DANG THA DAD GYI
BYE BRAG MA YIN PAR THAL, MI RTAG PA DANG THA DAD MA YIN PA'I
PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that "changing thing" is not characteristic of
"distinct from 'changing thing'."]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that "changing thing" is not characteristic of "distinct from 'changing thing' "].

Consider "changing thing."

It is so [not correct to say that it is characteristic of the quality of "distinct from 'changing thing',"]

Because it is not distinct from "changing thing."

MA GRUB NA, MI RTAG PA CHOS CAN, KHYOD KHYOD DANG THA DAD
MA YIN PAR THAL, KHYOD GANG ZAG GI BDAG MED YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that "changing thing" is not distinct from
"changing thing."]

Suppose you say it's not correct [to say that "changing thing" is not distinct from
"changing thing"].

It is so true, that it is not distinct from itself,

Because it is an example of something where the person has no nature of its own.

KHA CIG NA RE, SPYI' I SPYI YANG YIN, BYE BRAG GI BYE BRAG KYANG
YIN PA'I GZHI MTHUN PA MED ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

There exists no one thing which is both (1) a quality of a quality of
which something is characteristic, and also (2) characteristic of
something which is characteristic of a certain quality.

DE YOD PAR THAL, RTAG PA DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

Isn't it though so, that there is such a thing?

Because "unchanging thing" is just such a thing.

MA GRUB NA, RTAG PA CHOS CAN, KHYOD SPYI' I SPYI YANG YIN, BYE
BRAG GI BYE BRAG KYANG YIN PA'I GZHI MTHUN PA YIN PAR THAL,
KHYOD SPYI' I SPYI YIN PA GANG ZHIG BYE BRAG GI BYE BRAG YIN PA'I

PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that "unchanging thing" is one thing which is both (1) a quality of a quality of which something is characteristic, and also (2) characteristic of something which is characteristic of a certain quality.]

Consider "unchanging thing."

It is so one thing which is both (1) a quality of a quality of which something is characteristic, and also (2) characteristic of something which is characteristic of a certain quality,

Because it is a quality of which "quality" is characteristic, and it is characteristic of the quality of "characteristic."

RTAGS DANG PO MA GRUB NA, RTAG PA CHOS CAN, KHYOD SPYI'I SPYI YIN PAR THAL, SPYI KHYOD KYI BYE BRAG YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[The first part of your reason is not correct: it's not correct to say that "unchanging thing" is a quality of which "quality" is characteristic.]

Consider "unchanging thing."

It is so a quality of which "quality" is characteristic,

Because "quality" is something which is characteristic of it.

RTAGS GNYIS PA MA GRUB NA, RTAG PA CHOS CAN, BYE BRAG GI BYE BRAG YIN PAR THAL, KHYOD BYE BRAG YIN, KHYOD BYE BRAG DANG BDAG GCIG TU 'BREL, KHYOD MA YIN ZHING BYE BRAG KYANG YIN PA'I GZHI MTHUN PA DU MA GRUB PA'I PHYIR,

[The second part of your reason is not correct: it's not correct to say that "unchanging thing" is characteristic of the quality of "characteristic."]

Suppose you disagree to the second part of our reason, [saying that it's not correct to say that "unchanging thing" is characteristic of the quality of "characteristic"].

Consider "unchanging thing."

It is so characteristic of the quality of "characteristic,"

Because (1) it is characteristic of a quality; (2) it has a relationship with "characteristic" such that to be it is to automatically be characteristic of a quality; and (3) there exist multiple things which are both not it, but still characteristic of a quality.

KHA CIG, RTAG PA'I SPYI YIN NA, RTAG PA'I BYE BRAG MA YIN PAS
KHYAB ZER NA,

Someone may come and make the following claim:

Nothing which is a quality of which "unchanging thing" is characteristic can ever be characteristic of the quality "unchanging thing."

SPYI CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DE'I PHYIR,

Consider "quality."

So is it then never characteristic of the quality "unchanging thing"?

Because it is a quality of which "unchanging thing" is characteristic.

DER THAL, RTAG PA KHYOD KYI BYE BRAG YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's incorrect to say that "quality" is a quality of which "unchanging thing" is characteristic.]

It is so a quality of which "unchanging thing" is characteristic,

Because "unchanging thing" is characteristic of the quality "quality."

DER THAL, RTAG PA SPYI YIN, RTAG PA SPYI DANG BDAG GCIG TU
'BREL, RTAG PA MA YIN ZHING SPYI YANG YIN PA'I GZHI MTHUN PA DU
MA GRUB PA'I PHYIR,

[It's incorrect to say that "unchanging thing" is characteristic of the quality "quality."]

It is so characteristic of the quality "quality,"

Because (1) "unchanging thing" is a quality; (2) "unchanging thing" has a relationship with "quality" such that to be "unchanging thing" is to automatically be a quality; and (3) there exist multiple things which are both not an unchanging thing, but still a quality.

RTZA BAR 'DOD NA, SPYI CHOS CAN, RTAG PA'I BYE BRAG YIN PAR THAL, KHYOD RTAG PA YIN, KHYOD RTAG PA DANG BDAG GCIG TU 'BREL, KHYOD MA YIN ZHING RTAG PA YANG YIN PA'I GZHI MTHUN DU MA GRUB PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree with your original statement: "quality" is never characteristic of the quality "unchanging thing."]

Suppose you agree with our original statement, [saying that "quality" is never characteristic of the quality "unchanging thing"].

Consider "quality."

It is so characteristic of the quality "unchanging thing,"

Because (1) it is an unchanging thing; (2) it has a relationship with "unchanging thing" such that to be "quality" is to automatically be an unchanging thing; and (3) there exist multiple things which are both not "quality," but still an unchanging thing.

KHA CIG, DNGOS PO'I SPYI YIN NA, DNGOS PO'I BYE BRAG MA YIN PAS MA KHYAB ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

It's not necessarily the case that anything which is a quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic can never be characteristic of the quality "changing thing."

MI 'THAD DE, DNGOS PO'I SPYI DANG DNGOS PO'I BYE BRAG GNYIS KA YIN PA MED PA'I PHYIR,

But this is incorrect,

Because there exists nothing which is both a quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic and which is also characteristic of the quality "changing

thing."

DER THAL, DER GYUR PA'I RTAG PA YANG MED, DER GYUR BA'I MI
RTAG PA YANG MED PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that there exists nothing which is both a
quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic and also
characteristic of the quality "changing thing."]

It is so [correct to say that there exists nothing which is both a quality of which
"changing thing" is characteristic and which is also characteristic of the
quality "changing thing"],

Because there exists neither an unchanging version nor a changing version [of
something which is both a quality of which "changing thing" is
characteristic and which is also characteristic of the quality "changing
thing"].

DANG PO DER THAL, RTAG PA YIN NA DNGOS PO'I BYE BRAG MA YIN
PAS KHYAB PA'I PHYIR TE, RTAG PA YIN NA, DNGOS PO MA YIN PAS
KHYAB PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that there exists no unchanging version.]

The first point in the reason is so [—that is, it is correct to say that there exists no
unchanging version of something which both a quality of which
"changing thing" is characteristic and which is also characteristic of the
quality "changing thing"],

Because something which is an unchanging thing can never be characteristic of
the quality "working thing";

Which is to say, if something is unchanging, it can never be a working thing.

GONG GI RTAGS GNYIS PA GRUB STE, DNGOS PO'I SPYIR GYUR PA'I
DNGOS PO YIN NA, GANG DRAN DRAN YIN PAS KHYAB PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say there exists no changing version.]

The second point in our reason is so [—that is, it is correct to say that there exists
no changing version of something which both a quality of which
"changing thing" is characteristic and which is also characteristic of the
quality "changing thing"],

Because if there existed a changing thing that could be a quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic, then you could make up anything at all.

RANG RES DNGOS PO YIN NA, DNGOS PO'I SPYI MA YIN PAS KHYAB BYAS PA LA, KHA CIG NA RE, SGRA MI RTAG PA CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DE'I PHYIR ZER NA RTAGS MA GRUB PO,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim regarding our statement that, if something is a working thing, it can never be a quality of which "working thing" is characteristic:

Consider the fact that sound is a changing thing.
Is it then [not a quality of which "working thing" is characteristic]?
Because it is a working thing.

Our definitive answer would be to say, "It's not correct [to say that this fact is a working thing"].

'DOD MI NUS TE, SGRA MI RTAG PA DNGOS PO'I SPYI YIN PA'I PHYIR TE, , DNGOS PO SGRA MI RTAG PA'I BYE BRAG YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree with the original statement: the fact that sound is a changing thing is not a quality of which "working thing" is characteristic.]

But you cannot agree to the original statement,
Because the fact that sound is a changing thing is a quality of which "working things" is characteristic,
Because working things are characteristic of the fact that sound is a changing thing.

DER THAL, DNGOS PO SGRA MI RTAG PA YIN, DNGOS PO SGRA MI RTAG PA DANG BDAG GCIG TU 'BREL, DNGOS PO MA YIN ZHING SGRA MI RTAG PA YANG YIN PA'I GZHI MTHUN DU MA GRUB PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that working things are characteristic of the fact that sound is a changing thing.]

It is so [correct to say that working things are characteristic of the fact that sound is a changing thing],

Because (1) working things are "sound is a changing thing"; (2) working things are related to "sound is a changing thing" in such a way that to be a working thing is to automatically be "sound is a changing thing"; and (3) there exist multiple other things which are both not a working thing and yet still "sound is a changing thing."

RTAGS PHYI MA DER THAL, SHES BYA YANG DE YIN, RTAG PA DE YANG DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[The final part of your reason is not correct; that is, it is not correct to say that there exist multiple other things which are both not a working thing and yet still "sound is a changing thing."]

The final part of our reason is so true; [that is, it is correct to say that there exist multiple other things which are both not a working thing and yet are still "sound is a changing thing"],

Because "existing things" are one, and "unchanging things" are one as well.

DER THAL, BDAG MED YIN NA, SGRA MI RTAG PA YIN PAS KHYAB PA'I PHYIR,

[It's wrong to say that "existing things" and "unchanging things" are things which are both not a working thing and yet are still "sound is a changing thing."]

It is so [correct, to say that "existing things" and "unchanging things" are things which are both not a working thing and yet are still "sound is a changing thing"],

Because anything which has no self-nature is always "sound is a changing thing."

KHA CIG NA RE, BLO'I BYE BRAG YIN NA, DNGOS PO'I BYE BRAG YIN PAS KHYAB ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything which is characteristic of the quality "mental object" is also always characteristic of the quality "working thing."

DNGOS PO'I RGYUR GYUR PA'I TSAD MA DANG BCAD BSHES GNYIS CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DE'I PHYIR, KHYAB PA KHAS,

Consider the two of valid perception and reflection that act as a cause for a working thing.

So are they then [characteristic of the quality "working thing"]?

Because they are [characteristic of the quality "mental object"].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, KHYOD BLO YIN, KHYOD BLO DANG BDAG GCIG TU 'BREL, KHYOD MA YIN ZHING , BLO YANG YIN PA'I GZHI MTHUN PA DU MA GRUB PA'I PHYIR,

[It's incorrect to say that the two of valid perception and reflection that act as a cause for a working thing are characteristic of the quality "mental object."]

Suppose you say that it's incorrect [to say that the two of valid perception and reflection that act as a cause for a working thing are characteristic of the quality "mental object"].

They are so [characteristic of the quality "mental object"],

Because (1) the two of them are mental objects; (2) they share a relationship with "mental object" such that to be the two of them is to automatically be the mental object; and (3) there exist multiple things which are not the two of them but are still mental objects.

DANG PO DANG GNYIS PA SLA, GSUM PA MA GRUB NA, DE 'DRA BA'I GZHI MTHUN PA DU MA GRUB PAR THAL, RNAM MKHYEN DE YANG DE YIN, TSAD MA DE YANG DE YIN, DE GNYIS PHAN TSUN THA DAD DU GRUB PA'I PHYIR,

The first and second parts of our reason are easy to accept; suppose you say that the third is not correct; [which is to say, there do not exist multiple things which are both not the two of valid perception and reflection, but which are still mental objects].

It is so true, that there exist multiple things which are both [not the two of valid perception and reflection, but which are still mental objects],
Because omniscience is just such a thing, and valid perception is just such a thing—the two do exist as separate things.

RTZA BAR 'DOD NA, DE CHOS CAN, DNGOS PO'I BYE BRAG MA YIN PAR
THAL, DNGOS PO DANG BDAG GCIG TU 'BREL PA MA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree with your original statement: the two are
characteristic of the quality "working thing."]

Suppose you agree with our original statement.

Consider these same two.

They are not so—they are not characteristic of the quality "working thing,"
Because they cannot share a relationship with "working thing" such that to be
them is to automatically be the working thing.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DNGOS PO'I RGYU YIN PA'I
PHYIR, RTAGS SLA,

[It's not correct to say that they cannot share a relationship with
"working thing" such that to be them is to automatically be
the working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that they cannot share a relationship
with "working thing" such that to be them is to automatically be the
working thing].

Consider these same two.

It is so correct [to say that they cannot share a relationship with "working thing"
such that to be them is to automatically be the working thing],
Because they are the cause of the working thing.

Our reason is easy to accept.

GNYSIS PA RANG LUGS LA, SPYI' I MTSAN NYID YOD DE, RANG GI GSAL
BA LA RJES SU 'GRO BA' I CHOS DE DE YIN PA' I PHYIR,

Here secondly is the part where we present our own position. There does exist a definition of "something general," because "any existing thing which subsumes its members" is the definition.

SPYI LA SGRAS BRJOD RIGS KYI SGO NAS DBYE NA GSUM YOD DE, RIGS
SPYI, DON SPYI, TSOGS SPYI DANG GSUM YOD PA' I PHYIR,

Nominally speaking, things that are "general" may be divided into three different types: general things as far as types, general things as far as objects, and general things as far as collections of parts.

RIGS SPYI' I MTSAN NYID YOD DE, RANG GI RIGS CAN DU MA LA RJES SU
'GRO BA' I CHOS DE DE YIN PA' I PHYIR, MTSAN GZHI YOD DE, SHES BYA
DE DE YIN PA' I PHYIR,

There does exist a definition of a "general thing as far as types" (or "quality"), because "that existing thing which subsumes the multiple things which are of its type" is the definition. A classical example of a "general thing as far as types" (or "quality") does exist, because "knowable things" is one.

BUM PA' I DON SPYI' I MTSAN NYID YOD DE, BUM 'DZIN RTOG PA LA BUM
PA MA YIN BZHIN DU BUM PA LTA BUR SNANG BA' I SGRO BTAGS KYI
CHA DE DE YIN PA' I PHYIR, MTSAN GZHI YOD DE, BUM 'DZIN RTOG PA
SKAD CIG MA GNYIS PA LA BUM PA SKAD CIG GNYIS PA MA YIN PA LAS
LOG PAR SNANG BA DE DE YIN PA' I PHYIR,

There does exist a definition of a "general thing as far as objects" (or "actual mental image") relating to a water pitcher, because it is the following: "That element which is imputed to be the water pitcher, but which is not: that thing which appears to be the water pitcher to the conceptual state of mind which is perceiving a water pitcher, but which is however not the water pitcher."

A classical example of a "general thing as far as objects" (or "actual mental

image") does exist, because "the appearance, to the second instant of a conceptual state of mind which is perceiving a water pitcher, of the opposite of all that is not the water pitcher of the second instant" is just this kind of example.

TSOGS SPYI'I MTSAN NYID YOD DE, RANG GI CHA SHAS DU MA 'DUS PA'I GZUGS RAGS PA DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR, MTSAN GZHI YOD DE, BUM PA DANG KA BA LTA BU DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

There does exist a definition of a "general thing as far as a collection of parts," because it is the following: "A gross physical object which is composed of its multiple parts."

Classical examples of a "general thing as far as a collection of parts" do exist, because a water pitcher or a pillar would each be one.

TSOGS SPYI DANG , RIGS SPYI'I GZHI MTHUN YOD DE, BUM PA DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

There does exist one thing which is both a "general as far as a collection of parts" and a "general as far as types" (or "quality"), because the water pitcher would be one.

TSOGS SPYI MA YIN PA DANG , RIGS SPYI'I GZHI MTHUN YOD YOD DE, SHES BYA DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

There does exist one thing which is both not a "general as far as a collection of parts" and yet still a "general as far as types" (or "quality"), because "knowable things" would be one.

RIGS SPYI MA YIN PA DANG , TSOGS SPYI'I GZHI MTHUN YOD DE, KA BUM GNYIS DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

There does exist one thing which is both not a "general as far as types" (or "quality") and yet still a "general as far as a collection of parts," because the two of a pillar and a pitcher would be one.

RIGS SPYI MA YIN PA DANG , TSOGS SPYI MA YIN PA'I GZHI MTHUN YOD DE, RTAG DNGOS GNYIS DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

There does exist one thing which is neither a "general as far as types" ("quality")

nor a "general as far as a collection of parts," because the two of "changing things" and "unchanging things" would be one.

BYE BRAG GI MTSAN NYID YOD DE, KHYAB BYED DU 'JUG PA'I RANG GI RIGS YOD PA CAN GYIS CHOS DE, RANG NYID BYE BRAG YIN PA'I MTSAN NYID YIN PA'I PHYIR,

There does exist a definition of a "member" (or "something characteristic of a particular quality"), because "an existing object which is an example of a particular type which subsumes it" is this very definition.

GSUM PA RTZOD PA SPONG BA LA KHO NA RE, KA BUM GNYIS CHOS CAN, SPYI YIN PAR THAL, TSOGS SPYI YIN PA'I PHYIR NA MA KHYAB, RTAGS GRUB STE, RDUL RDZAS BRGYAD 'DUS KYI GONG BU YIN PA'I PHYIR,

Here finally is the third part, eliminating any rebuttal concerning our position.

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.
They are so something general,
Because they are generals in the sense of a collection of parts.

To this we answer, "It is not necessarily the case."

The reason though is correct, because they are units composed of molecules containing the eight substances, [which are: the four elements of earth, water, fire, and wind; and the four objects of visual form, smells, tastes, and touches].

'DOD NA, DE CHOS CAN, SPYI MA YIN PAR THAL, KHYOD KYI BYE BRAG MED PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree to your statement: I agree that the two of a pillar and a water pitcher are something general.]

Suppose you agree to our statement, [and agree that the two of a pillar and a

water pitcher are something general].

It is not so, that they are something general, a general quality,
Because there is nothing which is characteristic of them.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, KHYOD YIN PA MI SRID PA'I
SHES BYA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that there is nothing which is characteristic of
a pillar and a water pitcher.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that there is nothing which is
characteristic of a pillar and a water pitcher].

Consider these same things.

It is so true, [that there is nothing which is characteristic of a pillar and a water
pitcher],

Because they are a knowable object which is not.

YANG KHO NA RE, SHES BYA DE SPYI MA YIN PAR THAL, DE SHES BYA
YIN PA'I SPYI MA YIN PA'I PHYIR NA MA KHYAB,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Isn't it so, that "knowable objects" itself is not a quality?

Because isn't it not a quality of which that thing which is "knowable
objects" is characteristic?

Our answer is: "It doesn't necessarily follow."

MA GRUB NA, DE SHES BYA YIN PA'I SPYI MA YIN PAR THAL, SHES BYA
YIN PA'I SPYI MED PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that "knowable objects" is not a quality of
which that thing which is "knowable objects" is
characteristic.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that "knowable objects" is not a quality of which that thing which is "knowable objects" is characteristic].

It is so true, that it is not a quality of which that thing which is "knowable objects" is characteristic,

Because there exists no quality of which that thing which is "knowable objects" is characteristic.

MA GRUB NA, DER THAL, SHES BYA'I SPYI MED PA GANG ZHIG, SHES BYA DANG , SHES BYA YIN PA GNYIS DON GCIG YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that there is no quality of which that thing which is "knowable objects" is characteristic.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that there is no quality of which that thing which is "knowable objects" is characteristic].

It is so [correct to say that there is no quality of which that thing which is "knowable objects" is characteristic],

Because (1) there exists no quality of which "knowable objects" is characteristic, and (2) "knowable objects" and "that thing which is knowable objects" are synonyms.

GONG DU 'DOD NA, SHES BYA CHOS CAN, SPYI YIN PAR THAL, RANG GI GSAL BA LA RJES SU 'GRO BA'I CHOS YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree to the statement above: "knowable objects" itself is not a quality.]

Suppose you agree to the statement above, [and say that "knowable objects" itself is not a quality].

Consider "knowable objects."

It is so a quality,

Because it is an existing thing which subsumes its members.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, RANG GI RIGS CAN DU MA LA RJES SU 'GRO BA'I CHOS YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that "knowable objects" is an existing thing

which subsumes its members.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that "knowable objects" is an existing thing which subsumes its members.]

Consider this same thing.

It is so [an existing thing which subsumes its members],

Because it is an existing thing which subsumes the multiple members which are of its type.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, RANG GI RIGS CAN DU MA LA
RJES SU 'GRO BA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that "knowable objects" is an existing thing
which subsumes the multiple members which are of its
type.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that "knowable objects" is an existing thing which subsumes the multiple members which are of its type.]

Consider this same thing.

It is so [an existing thing which subsumes the multiple members which are of its type],

Because it subsumes the multiple members which are of its type.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, RTAG DNGOS THAMS CAD
KHYOD KYI RIGS SU GTOGS PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that "knowable objects" subsumes the multiple
members which are of its type.]

Consider this same thing.

It is so true, [that it subsumes the multiple members which are of its type],

Because all objects, whether they are unchanging things or working things, are of its type.

YANG KHO NA RE, SHES BYA MA YIN PA'I SPYI YIN PAR THAL, MA YIN
PA SHES BYA'I BYE BRAG YIN PA'I PHYIR ZER NA MA KHYAB,

Suppose someone returns and makes the following claim:

Is it then so, that "knowable things" is a quality of which "not being" is characteristic?

Because "not being" is characteristic of the quality "knowable things."

Our answer is: "It's not necessarily the case."

'DOD NA, SHES BYA MA YIN PA'I SPYI MA YIN PAR THAL, SHES BYA MA YIN PA'I SPYI YIN NA GANG DRAN DRAN YIN PAS KHYAB PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree to the statement: It is so, that "knowable things" is a quality of which "not being" is characteristic.]

Suppose you agree to the statement, [and say that "knowable things" is a quality of which "not being" is characteristic].

It is not so, that "knowable things" is a quality of which "not being" is characteristic,

Because if something were a quality of which something that was not a knowable thing were characteristic, then you could always make up anything at all.

YANG KHO NA RE, BYE BRAG MA YIN PA'I BYE BRAG YOD PAR THAL, SPYI MA YIN PA'I SPYI YOD PA'I PHYIR NA MA KHYAB,

Suppose again that someone makes the following claim:

It is so that there exists something which is characteristic of something which is not characteristic of something,

Because it is true that there exists something which is a quality of something which is not a quality.

Our answer is, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

RTAGS GRUB STE, SHES BYA DE SPYI MA YIN PA'I SPYI YIN PA'I PHYIR,

It is correct by the way to say that there does exist something which is a quality of something which is not a quality,
Because "knowable things" is something which is a quality of something which is not a quality.

MA GRUB NA, SHES BYA CHOS CAN, SPYI MA YIN PA'I SPYI YIN PAR THAL, SPYI MA YIN PA KHYOD KYI BYE BRAG YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that "knowable things" is something which is a quality of something which is not a quality.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that "knowable things" is something which is a quality of something which is not a quality].

Consider "knowable things."
It is so a quality of something which is not a quality,
Because "something which is not a quality" is characteristic of it.

YANG KHO NA RE, SHES BYA CHOS CAN, SPYI MA YIN PA'I SPYI MA YIN PAR THAL, SPYI YIN PA'I SPYI YIN PA'I PHYIR ZER NA MA KHYAB,

Suppose again that someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider "knowable things."
It isn't so, that it is a quality of that which is not a quality,
Because it is a quality of that which is "quality."

Our answer is, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

RTAGS GRUB STE, SPYI YIN PA KHYOD KYI BYE BRAG YIN PA'I PHYIR,

It is true though to say that "knowable things" is a quality of that which is "quality," because "quality" is characteristic of it.

YANG KHO NA RE, RTAG PA SGRA MI RTAG PA'I BYE BRAG MA YIN PAR THAL, DNGOS PO SGRA MI RTAG PA'I BYE BRAG YIN PA'I PHYIR ZER NA

Suppose someone comes again and makes the following claim:

Isn't it so, that "unchanging things" is not characteristic of "sound is a changing thing"?

Because isn't it true, that "working things" is characteristic of "sound is a changing thing"?

MA KHYAB STE, RTAG PA SGRA MI RTAG PA'I BYE BRAG YIN PAR THAL, SGRA MI RTAG PA RANG GI GSAL BA RTAG PA LA RJES SU 'GRO BA'I CHOS YIN PA'I PHYIR,

Our answer is, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

It is so true, that "unchanging things" is characteristic of "sound is a changing thing,"

Because "sound is a changing thing" is an existing thing which subsumes its member "unchanging things."

DER THAL, DE'I GSAL BA LA RTAG PA YOD PA'I PHYIR TE, DE'I GSAL BA LA RTAG DNGOS GNYIS KA YOD PA'I PHYIR,

[It's incorrect to say that "sound is a changing thing" is an existing thing which subsumes its member "unchanging things."]

It is so true [that "sound is a changing thing" is an existing thing which subsumes its member "unchanging things"],

Because it does have a member called "unchanging things."

And this is true because both "unchanging things" and "working things" are members that it has.

KHO NA RE, YOD PA CHOS CAN, BYE BRAG YIN PAR THAL, KHYAB BYED DU 'JUG PA'I RANG GI RIGS YOD PA CAN GYI CHOS YIN PA'I PHYIR, DER THAL, KHYAB BYED DU 'JUG PA'I YOD PA YOD PA'I PHYIR ZER NA

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider "existing things."

So it must then be characteristic of something,

Because it is an existing object which is an example of a particular type which subsumes it.

[It's incorrect to say that it is an existing object which is an example of a particular type which subsumes it.]

It is so an existing object which is an example of a particular type which subsumes it,

Because there does exist an existence which subsumes it.

MA KHYAB STE, MTSAN NYID KYI ZUR DU RANG GI RIGS YOD PA ZHES SMOS PA LA DGOS PA YOD PA'I PHYIR,

Our answer is, "It doesn't necessary follow." And this is because there is a very important point served by saying the words "an example" in the definition of being characteristic of something.

**Formal logic subject:
Similar cases, dissimilar cases, and
"similar examples" in a logical statement**

GNYSIS PA KHYAB PA'I LTOS GZHI MTHUN PHYOGS DANG MI MTHUN PHYOGS GNYIS BSHAD PA LA, DNGOS BSHAD PA DANG , ZHAR LA MTHUN DPE DANG MI MTHUN DPE BSHAD PA GNYIS,

This brings us to the second section of our explanation of the pivotal objects: an explanation of the pivotal object in the necessary relationships between the quality to be proven and the reason—that is, the groups of similar cases and dissimilar cases. We will proceed in two steps: the actual explanation, and an incidental treatment of the similar example and the dissimilar example.

DANG PO LA, MTSAN NYID, DBYE BA, SGRA BSHAD 'JUG GI MU BZHI RTZI BA, MTHUN PHYOGS DANG MI MTHUN PHYOGS GNYIS DNGOS

'GAL YIN MIN LA DPYAD PA DANG BZHI,

The first of these comes in four parts of its own:

- 1) definitions;
- 2) divisions;
- 3) a calculation of the permutations based on whether the cases actually fit their name; and
- 4) an analysis of whether the groups of similar cases and dissimilar cases are directly contradictory or not.

DANG PO LA SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA'I BSGRUB TSUL DANG MTHUN PAR MI RTAG PAS MI STONG PA, SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA'I MTHUN PHYOGS KYI MTSAN NYID, MI RTAG PA DANG DE SGRUB KYI MTHUN PHYOGS GNYIS YIN KHYAB MNYAM YIN,

Here is the first. The following is the definition of the group of similar cases in a proof that sounds are changing things:

All those things which are not void of the quality of being changing things, in keeping with the way in which sounds are proven to be changing things in any particular logical statement.

"Changing things" and the group of similar cases in just such a proof are such that to be one is always to automatically be the other.

DE SGRUB KYI BSGRUB TSUL DANG MI MTHUN PAR MI RTAG PAS STONG PA, DE SGRUB KYI MI MTHUN PHYOGS KYI MTSAN NYID, MI RTAG PA MA YIN PA DANG DE GNYIS YIN KHYAB MNYAM YIN,

The following is the definition of the group of dissimilar cases:

All those things which are void of the quality of being changing things, in keeping with the way in which this proof is made in the particular logical statement.

"All that is not a changing thing" and this same group are such that to be one is always to be the other.

GNYIS PA DE LA DBYE NA, DE SGRUB KYI MED PA MI MTHUN PHYOGS,

GZHAN PA MI MTHUN PHYOGS, 'GAL BA MI MTHUN PHYOGS DANG GSUM,

Here secondly are the divisions. The group of dissimilar cases can come in three different types:

- 1) The group of dissimilar cases that are not existing things;
- 2) The group of dissimilar cases that are something else; and
- 3) The group of dissimilar cases that are directly contradictory.

RI BONG RVA DANG PO, , SHES BYA GNYIS PA, RTAG PA GSUM PA YIN,

An example of the first would be the horns on a rabbit's head. An example of the second would be "knowable things." An example of the third would be "unchanging things."

GSUM PA NI, DE SGRUB KYI MTHUN PHYOGS YIN NA, DE SGRUB KYI MTHUN PHYOGS KYI SGRA BSHAD DU YOD PAS KHYAB BAM ZHE NA,

Here is the third part. One may ask the following:

If something is part of a group of similar cases in any particular proof, is it then necessarily part of such a group in such a way that it fits the name of the group?

'DI LA MU GSUM STE, DE SGRUB KYI MTHUN PHYOGS YIN LA, DE SGRUB KYI MTHUN PHYOGS KYI SGRA BSHAD DU MED PA'I MU, GNYIS KA YIN PA'I MU, GNYIS KA MA YIN PA'I MU DANG GSUM,

Three of the permutations here hold. There do exist the following:

- 1) Something which is part of a group of similar cases in a particular proof, but which is not part of this group in such a way that it fits the name of the group;
- 2) Something which is both [part of a group of similar cases in a particular proof and which is also part of this group in such a way that it fits the name of the group]; and
- 3) Something which is neither [part of a group of similar cases nor part of this group in such a way that it fits the name of the group].

'DUS MA BYAS KYI NAM MKHA' DE, SGRA RTAG PAR SGRUB PA'I MTHUN PHYOGS YIN LA, DE SGRUB KYI MTHUN PHYOGS KYI SGRA BSHAD DU MED PA'I MU YIN,

"That unproduced thing which is empty space" is an example of the first permutation: it is something which is part of a group of similar cases in a proof that sounds are unchanging things, but it is not part of this group in such a way that it fits the name of the group.

DE SGRUB PA NI, DE CHOS CAN, DE SGRUB KYI MTHUN PHYOGS YIN PAR THAL, RTAG PA YIN PA'I PHYIR, DE SGRUB KYI MTHUN PHYOGS KYI SGRA BSHAD DU MED DE, DE DANG SGRA GNYIS RTAG PAR CHOS MI MTHUN PA'I PHYIR,

Here is a proof that this is true:

Consider this same thing [unproduced, empty space].

It is a part of the group of similar cases in the proof mentioned,
Because it is an unchanging thing.

It is not part of this group in such a way that it fits the name
of the group,
Because it is not a thing which is *similar* to sounds in the sense that
they are both unchanging things.

GNYIS KA YIN PA'I MU NI, BUM PA DE SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA'I MTHUN PHYOGS DANG , DE SGRUB KYI MTHUN PHYOGS KYI SGRA BSHAD DU YOD PA'I MU GNYIS KA YIN,

Now for the second permutation: something which is both. A water pitcher is both something which is part of the group of similar cases in a proof that sound is changing, and also something which is part of this group in such a way that it fits the name of the group.

DE SGRUB PA NI, BUM PA CHOS CAN, DE SGRUB KYI MTHUN PHYOGS YIN PAR THAL, MI RTAG PA YIN PA'I PHYIR, DE CHOS CAN, DE'I SGRA BSHAD DU YOD DE, KHYOD DANG SGRA GNYIS MI RTAG PAR CHOS MTHUN PA'I PHYIR TE, KHYOD KYANG MI RTAG PA YIN, SGRA YANG MI

RTAG PA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

Here is a proof that this is true:

Consider a water pitcher.

It is so something which is part of the group of similar cases of this
same proof,

Because it is a changing thing.

Consider this same thing.

It is a part of this group in such a way that it fits the name of the
group,

Because it is a thing which is *similar* to sounds in the sense that they
are both changing things: a water pitcher is a changing
thing, and a sound is also a changing thing.

GNYSIS KA MA YIN PA'I MU NI, 'DUS MA BYAS KYI NAM MKHA' DE, SGRA
MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA'I MTHUN PHYOGS MA YIN PA DANG , DE SGRUB
KYI MTHUN PHYOGS KYI SGRA BSHAD DU MED PA'I MU GNYIS KA YIN,

Next is the permutation where something is neither. "The unproduced thing
called 'empty space'" is something which is neither part of the group of similar
cases in a proof that sound is a changing thing, nor a part of this group in such a
way that it fits the name of the group.

DE SGRUB PA NI, DE CHOS CAN, DE SGRUB KYI MTHUN PHYOGS MA YIN
PAR THAL, MI RTAG PA MA YIN PA'I PHYIR, DE CHOS CAN, DE'I SGRA
BSHAD DU MED DE, KHYOD DANG SGRA GNYIS MI RTAG PAR CHOS MI
MTHUN PA'I PHYIR TE, KHYOD RTAG PA GANG ZHIG, SGRA MI RTAG PA
YIN PA'I PHYIR,

Here is a proof that this is true:

Consider this same thing.

It is so true, that it is not a part of the group of similar cases in this
same proof,

Because it is not a changing thing.

Consider this same thing.

It is so true, that it is not a part of this same group in such a way

that it fits the name of the group,
Because it is not a thing which is *similar* to sounds in the sense that
they are both changing things: it is an unchanging thing, and
sound is a changing thing.

DE SGRUB KYI MTHUN PHYOGS KYI SGRA BSHAD DU YOD LA, DE SGRUB
KYI MTHUN PHYOGS MA YIN PA'I MU NI MED DE, DE SGRUB KYI MTHUN
PHYOGS KYI SGRA BSHAD DU YOD NA, DE SGRUB KYI MTHUN PHYOGS
YIN DGOS PA'I PHYIR,

There does not exist anything which would qualify as the final permutation; that
is, something which was a part of the group of similar cases in such a way that it
fit the name of the group, but which was not a part of the group of similar cases.
This is because anything which is part of the group of similar cases in such a way
that it fits the name of the group must also be part of the group of similar cases.

DE SGRUB KYI MTHUN PHYOGS ZHES PA'I PHYOGS DE YIN NA DE SGRUB
KYI BSGRUB BYA'I CHOS YIN PAS MA KHYAB STE, SGRA MI RTAG PAR
SGRUB PAR BYED PA'I MTHUN PHYOGS ZHES PA'I PHYOGS DANG DE
SGRUB KYI MTHUN PHYOGS LA YOD CES PA'I PHYOGS GNYIS MI 'DRA
BAR 'JOG DGOS PA'I PHYIR,

When we speak of the "group" (*chok*) in the "group of similar cases" (*tunchok*) we
are not necessarily speaking only of the quality to be proven in the particular
proof. This is because we have to draw a distinction between the "group" in the
"group of similar cases in a proof that sounds are changing things" and being *part*
of the group of similar cases in the same proof. [This distinction has already
been drawn for the reader in the translation above.]

MA KHYAB NA SLA, MA GRUB NA, DER THAL, SGRA MI RTAG PAR
SGRUB PAR BYED PA'I PHYOGS KYI RJES SU DPAG BYA 'AM PHYOGS KYI
SGRA'I 'JUG GZHI DE LA GSUM YOD PA LAS, DE SGRUB KYI PHYOGS
CHOS ZHES PA'I PHYOGS DE DE SGRUB KYI SHES 'DOD CHOS CAN LA
BYED, DE SGRUB KYI MTHUN PHYOGS LA YOD MED CES PA'I PHYOGS DE
DANG DE SGRUB KYI KHYAB PA'I 'BREL YUL GYI PHYOGS DE GNYIS DE
SGRUB KYI BSGRUB BYA'I CHOS SAM MI RTAG PA'I SPYI LDOG LA BYED
KYANG , DE SGRUB KYI MTHUN PHYOGS ZHES PA'I PHYOGS DE LA MI
RTAG PA'I SPYI LDOG DANG GZHI LDOG THAMS CAD 'JOG DGOS PA'I
PHYIR,

It's easy to see how you would prove someone wrong if they replied, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

Suppose though you say,

It's not correct [to say that we have to draw a distinction between the "group" in the "group of similar cases in a proof that sounds are changing things" and being *part* of the group of similar cases in the same proof].

It is so correct to say this, because there are three different things that the word *chok* can make you think of—there are three different things that the word *chok* can refer to—when we speak of the "*chok*" in a proof that sounds are changing things. The *chok* in the word *chokchu* ("relationship between the subject and the reason") refers to the subject in the particular logical statement: the thing which the opponent doubts possesses the quality to be proven.

Then there are pair of further uses of this word: the *chok* we use when we are discussing whether or not something is part of the group of similar cases (*tunchok*), and the *chok* we use when we are discussing the object related to, within the necessary relationships in a logical statement (*kyappay drelyul gyi chok*). Both of these refer to the general type represented by the quality to be proven, or—in this case—the general type represented by "changing thing."

Finally there is the word *chok* as we use it in the expression "group of similar cases" (*tunchok*) itself. Here the word must be understood as referring to everything: to both the general type and the specific instance represented by "changing thing."

DE SGRUB KYI MI MTHUN PHYOGS KYI SGRA BSHAD DU YOD NA, DE SGRUB KYI MI MTHUN PHYOGS YIN PAS KHYAB BAM ZHE NA,

One may ask the following question:

If something is part of the group of dissimilar cases for a particular proof in such a way that it fits the name of the group, is it then always something which is part of the group of dissimilar cases for the particular proof?

'DI LA MU GSUM YOD DE, 'DUS MA BYAS KYI NAM MKHA' DE SGRA

RTAG PAR SGRUB PA'I MI MTHUN PHYOGS KYI SGRA BSHAD DU YOD LA, DE SGRUB KYI MI MTHUN PHYOGS MA YIN PA'I MU YIN,

Three permutations hold here. The unproduced thing which is empty space is an example of the permutation where something is part of the group of dissimilar cases in the proof that sounds are unchanging things in such a way that it fits the name of the group, but is not part of the group of dissimilar cases.

BUM PA DE SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA'I GNYIS KA MA YIN PA'I MU YIN,

A water pitcher would be an example of the permutation where something is neither, in a proof that sound is a changing thing.

'DUS MA BYAS KYI NAM MKHA' DE SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA'I MI MTHUN PHYOGS KYI SGRA BSHAD DU YOD LA, DE SGRUB KYI MI MTHUN PHYOGS KYANG YIN PA'I MU YIN,

The unproduced thing which is empty space would be an example of the permutation where something is both part of the group of dissimilar cases in the proof that sounds are changing things in such a way that it fits the name of the group; and is also part of the group of dissimilar cases.

DE SGRUB KYI MI MTHUN PHYOGS YIN LA, DE SGRUB KYI MI MTHUN PHYOGS KYI SGRA BSHAD DU MED PA'I MU NI MED DE, DE SGRUB KYI MI MTHUN PHYOGS YIN NA, DE SGRUB KYI MI MTHUN PHYOGS KYI SGRA BSHAD DU YOD PAS KHYAB PA'I PHYIR,

One permutation here does not hold: where something is part of the group of dissimilar cases in the particular proof, but not part of the group of dissimilar cases for the particular proof in such a way that it fits the name of the group. This is because anything that is part of the group of dissimilar cases in a particular proof is always part of the group of dissimilar cases in the particular proof in such a way that it fits the name of the group.

BZHI PA MTHUN PHYOGS DANG MI MTHUN PHYOGS GNYIS DNGOS 'GAL YIN MIN LA DPYAD PA NI, MTHUN PHYOGS DE NI MI MTHUN PHYOGS DANG DNGOS 'GAL YIN KYANG , MI MTHUN PHYOGS MTHUN PHYOGS DANG DNGOS 'GAL MA YIN TE, MI MTHUN PHYOGS MED PA'I PHYIR,

Here lastly is the fourth point: an analysis of whether the groups of similar cases and dissimilar cases are directly contradictory or not. The group of similar cases stands in direct contradiction to the group of dissimilar cases, but the group of dissimilar cases does not stand in direct contradiction to the group of similar cases. This is because the group of dissimilar cases does not exist.

GZHI GRUB NA, MTHUN PHYOGS YIN PAS KHYAB PA'I PHYIR TE, GZHI GRUB NA, RTAGS YANG DAG GI MTHUN PHYOGS YIN PAS KHYAB PA'I PHYIR TE, GZHI GRUB NA, SGRA SHES BYAR SGRUB PA'I RTAGS YANG DAG GI MTHUN PHYOGS YIN PAS KHYAB PA'I PHYIR,

And this is true because any object which can be established as existing is always part of a group of similar cases. And this is because any object which can be established as existing is always a part of a group of similar cases for some correct reason. And this is because any object which can be established as existing is always a part of the group of similar cases for a correct reason in the proof that sound in a knowable thing.

DE LA KHO NA RE, MI MTHUN PHYOGS YOD PAR THAL, SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PAR BYED PA'I MI MTHUN PHYOGS YOD PA'I PHYIR DANG , CHOS MI MTHUN SBYOR GYI SGRUB NGAG YANG DAG KYANG YOD PA'I PHYIR NA MA KHYAB BO,

On this point, someone might come and make the following claim:

It is so true, that the group of dissimilar cases exists,
Because there does exist a group of dissimilar cases for the proof
that sounds are changing things; and also because there does
exist a "correct statement of proof that relates to what is
dissimilar."

Our answer would be: it doesn't necessary follow.

[An actual example of a "correct statement of proof that relates to what is dissimilar" would be the following:

*Things that are unchanging are always things that are not made —
It's like the example of empty space, an unproduced thing;
And so, sounds are things that are made.]*

,GNYSIS PA ZHAR LA MTHUN DPE DANG MI MTHUN DPE BSHAD PA LA,

Here is the second major topic—an incidental treatment of the similar example and the dissimilar example.

MTHUN DPER BZUNG BA, MTHUN DPE'I MTSAN NYID, BDAG MED YIN NA, DE YIN PAS KHYAB STE, GZHI GRUB NA, DE YIN PAS KHYAB, GZHI MA GRUB NA YANG DE YIN PAS KHYAB PA'I PHYIR,

The definition of a similar example is: "Anything considered a similar example." Anything that lacks a self-nature is always a similar example, because anything which can be established as existing [that is, which does exist,] is always a similar example, and anything which cannot be established as existing [that is, which doesn't exist,] is also always a similar example.

DANG PO DER THAL, BUM PA DE DE YIN PA GANG ZHIG, MTSUNGS PA'I PHYIR, GNYIS PA DER THAL, RI BONG GI RVA DE DE YIN PA GANG ZHIG, MTSUNGS PA'I PHYIR,

[The first part of your statement is not correct.]

It is so true, that the first part of our statement is correct,
Because "water pitcher" is one [similar example], and it is equivalent [to the case in question].

[The second part of your statement is not correct.]

It is so true, that the second part of our statement is correct,
Because "the horns on the head of a rabbit" is one [similar example], and it is equivalent [to the case in question].

DANG PO MA GRUB NA, RI BONG RVA CHOS CAN, DER THAL, SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA'I MTHUN DPER BZUNG BA'I PHYIR TE, SGRA CHOS CAN, MI RTAG STE, BYAS PA'I PHYIR, DPER NA KHYOD BZHIN ZHES PA'I SBYOR BA YANG YOD, BYAS NA, MI RTAG PAS KHYAB, DPER NA, KHYOD BZHIN ZHES PA'I SGRUB NGAG KYANG YOD PA'I PHYIR,

[The first part of your latest statement is not correct.]

Suppose you say that the first part of our last statement is not correct.

Consider the horns on the head of a rabbit.

They are too [a similar example],

Because they can be considered a similar example in a proof that sounds are changing things.

And this is true because there could exist a logical statement where someone said:

Consider sounds.

They are changing things,

Because they are things that are made;

It's just like the example of those [horns on a rabbit's head].

It is also true because there could exist a statement of proof where someone said:

Anything that is made

Is always something that is changing;

It's just like the example of those [horns on a rabbit's head].

SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA'I MTHUN DPER BZUNG BA, SGRA MI RTAG
PAR SGRUB PA'I MTHUN DPE'I MTSAN NYID, BDAG MED YIN NA, DE YIN
PAS KHYAB STE, GZHI GRUB NA ZHES SOGS RIGS 'GRE, BYAS PA'I RTAGS
LA YANG SBYAR BAR BYA'O, ,

Here is the definition of a similar example in a proof that sounds are changing things:

Anything that can be considered a similar example in a proof that sounds are changing things.

Anything that lacks a nature of its own is always just such an example,

Because anything that can be established as existing... (and then you can just follow the same pattern as above). You can apply all this as well to a proof where "because it is something made" is used as the reason for the same assertion.

MI MTHUN DPER BZUNG BA, MI MTHUN DPE'I MTSAN NYID MA YIN TE,
MI MTHUN DPE MED PA'I PHYIR TE, GZHI GRUB NA, MTHUN DPE YANG
DAG YIN PAS KHYAB PA'I PHYIR,

"Anything which is considered a dissimilar example" is not, however, the definition of a dissimilar example. This is because no dissimilar example exists: anything that can be established as existing is always a correct similar example.

'ON KYANG SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA'I MI MTHUN DPE YANG DAG
NI YOD PA GONG DU BSGRUBS ZIN,

There does however exist a correct dissimilar example for the proof that sounds are changing things; we've established all this already, earlier on.

` , LNGA PA RGYU 'BRAS CHUNG NGU'I RNAM BZHAG BSHAD PA LA,
DGAG BZHAG SPONG GSUM LAS,

Here is the fifth section, which is the more elementary presentation on causes and results. For this presentation we will first refute the position of our opponents, then present our own position, and then finally eliminate their rebuttal.

DANG PO LA, KHA CIG NA RE, GZHI GRUB NA, RGYU 'BRAS GANG RUNG
YIN PAS KHYAB ZER NA,

Here is the first. Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything which can be established as existing is always either a cause, a result, or both.

SHES BYA CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DE'I PHYIR,

Consider "knowable things."

So is it then [always either a cause, a result, or both]?

Because it is [a thing which can be established as existing].

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, TSAD MAS GRUB PA YIN PA'I
PHYIR,

[It's incorrect to say that it is a thing which can be established as

existing.]

Suppose you say that it's incorrect [to say that "knowable things" is a thing which can be established as existing].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [a thing which can be established as existing],

Because it can be established through valid perception as existing.

RTZA BAR 'DOD NA, DE CHOS CAN, RGYU 'BRAS GANG RUNG MA YIN
PAR THAL, DNGOS PO MA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree with your original statement: "knowable things" is
always either a cause, a result, or both.]

Suppose you agree with our original statement.

Consider this same thing.

It is not so, that "knowable things" is either a cause, a result, or both;

Because it is not a working thing.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, RTAG PA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say "knowable things" is not a working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that "knowable things" is not a
working thing].

Consider this same thing.

It is so true [that it's not a working thing],

Because it is an unchanging thing.

KHA CIG NA RE, RGYU YIN NA, 'BRAS BU MA YIN PAS KHYAB ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything which is a cause can never be a result.

DNGOS PO CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DE'I PHYIR, KHYAB PA KHAS,

Consider a working thing.

So is it then true [that it can never be a result]?

Because it is [a cause].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you have already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, KHYOD KYI 'BRAS BU YOD PA'I
PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is a cause.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing is a cause].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [a cause],

Because it has its own result.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DNGOS PO'I PHYI LOGS SU
BYUNG BA DE, KHYOD KYI 'BRAS BU YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a working thing has its own result.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing has its own
result].

Consider this same thing.

It does so [have its own result],

Because the working thing as it will be the moment after it is the result of the
working thing.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, KHYOD KYI PHYI LOGS SU BYUNG BA
KHYOD KYI 'BRAS BU YIN PAR THAL, KHYOD 'DUS BYAS YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that the working thing as it will be the
moment after it is the result of the working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the working thing as it will be the moment after it is the result of the working thing].

Consider this same thing.

It is so true that the working thing as it will be the moment after it is the result of the working thing,
Because it is a produced thing.

RTZA BAR 'DOD NA, DE CHOS CAN, 'BRAS BU YIN PAR THAL, KHYOD KYI RGYU YOD PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree with your original statement: a working thing can never be a result.]

Suppose you agree with our original statement; [that is, suppose you say that a working thing can never be a result].

Consider this same thing.

It is so a result,
Because it has its own cause.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, KHYOD KYI SNGA LOGS SU BYUNG BA DE, KHYOD KYI RGYU YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a working thing has its own cause.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing has its own cause].

Consider this same thing.

It does so [have its own cause],
Because the working thing as it was the moment before it is its cause.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, KHYOD DNGOS PO YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that the working thing as it was the moment before it is its cause.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the working thing as it was the moment before it is its cause].

Consider this same thing.

It is so true, [that the working thing as it was the moment before it is its cause],
Because it is a working thing.

KHA CIG NA RE, DNGOS RGYU YIN NA, BRGYUD RGYU MA YIN PAS
KHYAB ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Nothing which is a direct cause can ever be an indirect cause.

DNGOS PO CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DE'I PHYIR,

Consider a working thing.

Is it then so, [that it can never be an indirect cause]?
Because it is [a direct cause].

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DNGOS PO'I PHYI LOGS SU
BYUNG BA'I DNGOS RGYU YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is a direct cause.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing is a direct
cause].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [a direct cause],
Because it is a direct cause for the working thing as it will be the moment after it.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, KHYOD KHYOD KYI PHYI LOGS SU BYUNG
BA'I DNGOS RGYU YIN PAR THAL, KHYOD DNGOS PO YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is a direct cause for the
working thing as it will be the moment after it.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [that a working thing is a direct cause for the working thing as it will be the moment after it].

Consider this same thing.

It is so a direct cause for the working thing as it will be the moment after it,
Because it's a working thing.

RTZA BAR 'DOD NA, DE CHOS CAN, BRGYUD RGYU YIN PAR THAL,
DNGOS PO'I PHYI LOGS SU BYUNG BA'I PHYI LOGS SU BYUNG BA'I
BRGYUD RGYU YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree with your original statement: a working thing can
never be an indirect cause.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

Consider this same thing.

It is so an indirect cause,
Because it is an indirect cause of the working thing as it will be the moment after
the working thing as it will be the moment after it.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, KHYOD KHYOD KYI PHYI LOGS SU BYUNG
BA'I PHYI LOGS SU BYUNG BA'I BRGYUD RGYU YIN PAR THAL, KHYOD
'DUS BYAS YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is an indirect cause of
the working thing as it will be the moment after the working
thing as it will be the moment after it.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing is an indirect
cause of the working thing as it will be the moment after the working
thing as it will be the moment after it].

Consider this same thing.

It is so an indirect cause of the working thing as it will be the moment after the
working thing as it will be the moment after it,
Because it is a produced thing.

KHA CIG NA RE, DNGOS 'BRAS YIN NA, BRGYUD 'BRAS MA YIN PAS
KHYAB ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Nothing which is a direct result can ever be an indirect result.

DNGOS PO CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DE'I PHYIR,

Consider a working thing.

So can it never then be [an indirect result]?

Because it is [a direct result].

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DNGOS PO'I SNGA LOGS SU
BYUNG BA'I DNGOS 'BRAS YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is a direct result.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing is a direct
result].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [a direct result],

Because a working thing is a direct result of the working thing as it was the
moment before it.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, KHYOD KHYOD KYI SNGA LOGS BYUNG
BA'I DNGOS 'BRAS YIN PAR THAL, KHYOD BYAS PA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is a direct result of the
working thing as it was the moment before it.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing is a direct result
of the working thing as it was the moment before it].

Consider this same thing.

It is so a direct result of the working thing as it was the moment before it,

Because it's a thing which is made.

RTZA BAR 'DOD NA, DE CHOS CAN, BRGYUD 'BRAS YIN PAR THAL,
DNGOS PO'I SNGA LOGS SU BYUNG BA'I SNGA LOGS SU BYUNG BA'I
BRGYUD 'BRAS YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree with your original statement: a working thing can
never be an indirect result.]

Suppose you agree with our original statement.

Consider this same thing.

It is so an indirect result,

Because it is an indirect result of the working thing as it was the moment before
the working thing as it was the moment before it.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, KHYOD KHYOD KYI SNGA LOGS SU
BYUNG BA'I SNGA LOGS SU BYUNG BA'I BRGYUD 'BRAS YIN PAR THAL,
KHYOD 'DUS BYAS YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is an indirect result of
the working thing as it was the moment before the working
thing as it was the moment before it.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing is an indirect
result of the working thing as it was the moment before the working thing
as it was the moment before it].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [an indirect result of the working thing as it was the moment before the
working thing as it was the moment before it],

Because it is a thing that was produced.

KHA CIG NA RE, DNGOS PO'I RGYU YIN NA, DNGOS PO'I DNGOS RGYU
YIN PAS KHYAB ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything that is a cause for a working thing is always a direct cause for the working thing.

DNGOS PO'I SNGA LOGS SU BYUNG BA'I SNGA LOGS SU BYUNG BA CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DE'I PHYIR, KHYAB PA KHAS,

Consider the working thing as it was the moment before the working thing as it was the moment before it.

So is it then [a direct cause for the working thing]?

Because it is [a cause for the working thing].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DNGOS PO'I SNGA LOGS SU BYUNG BA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that the working thing as it was the moment before the working thing as it was the moment before it is a cause for the working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the working thing as it was the moment before the working thing as it was the moment before it is a cause for the working thing].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [a cause for the working thing],

Because it is the working thing as it was the moment before it.

RTZA BAR 'DOD NA, DE CHOS CAN, DNGOS PO'I DNGOS RGYU MA YIN PAR THAL, DNGOS PO'I BRGYUD RGYU YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree to your original statement: the working thing as it was the moment before the working thing as it was the moment before it is a direct cause for the working thing.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement, [which is to say, the working thing as it was the moment before the working thing as it was the moment before it is a direct cause for the working thing].

Consider this same thing.

It is not so, [that it is a direct cause of the working thing],

Because it is an indirect cause of the working thing.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DNGOS PO KHYOD KYI
BRGYUD 'BRAS YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that it is an indirect cause of the working
thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not [an indirect cause of the working thing.]

Consider this same thing.

It is so [an indirect cause of the working thing],

Because the working thing is its indirect result.

MA GRUB NA, DNGOS PO RANG GI SNGA LOGS SU BYUNG BA'I SNGA
LOGS SU BYUNG BA'I BRGYUD 'BRAS YIN PAR THAL, DNGOS PO RNAMS
RANG GI SNGA LOGS SU BYUNG BA'I SNGA LOGS SU BYUNG BA'I
BRGYUD 'BRAS DANG RANG GI SNGA LOGS SU BYUNG BA'I DNGOS
'BRAS SU 'JOG CING , DNGOS PO RNAMS RANG GI SNGA LOGS SU BYUNG
BA'I SNGA LOGS SU BYUNG BA RANG GI BRGYUD RGYU DANG , RANG GI
SNGA LOGS SU BYUNG BA RANG GI DNGOS RGYUR 'JOG DGOS PA'I
PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is an indirect result of
the working thing as it was the moment before the working
thing as it was the moment before it.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct to say [that a working thing is an indirect
result of the working thing as it was the moment before the working thing
as it was the moment before it].

It is so true, that a working thing is an indirect result of the working thing as it
was the moment before the working thing as it was the moment before it,
Because working things are established as being the indirect results of the
working things as they were the moment before the working things as
they were the moment before them; and as the direct results of the
working things as they were the moment before them. And working

things as they were the moment before the working things as they were the moment before them are established as being the indirect causes of working things, while working things as they were the moment before them are established as being the direct causes of those working things.

KHA CIG NA RE, DNGOS PO'I DNGOS 'BRAS YIN NA, DNGOS PO LAS
DNGOS SU SKYES PA'I 'BRAS BU YIN PAS KHYAB ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything which is the direct result of a working thing must always be a result corresponding to that which has grown directly from the working thing.

DNGOS PO'I PHYI LOGS SU BYUNG BA CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DE'I PHYIR,
KHYAB PA KHAS,

Consider the working thing as it will be the moment after it.

So is it then [a result corresponding to that which has grown directly from the working thing]?

Because it is [a direct result of the working thing].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

MA GRUB NA, DNGOS PO CHOS CAN, KHYOD KYI PHYI LOGS SU BYUNG
BA KHYOD KYI DNGOS 'BRAS YIN PAR THAL, KHYOD MI RTAG PA YIN
PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a working thing as it will be the moment after it is a direct result of the working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing as it will be the moment after it is a direct result of the working thing].

It is so true, that a working thing as it will be the moment after it is a direct result

of the working thing,
Because it is a changing thing.

RTZA BAR 'DOD NA, DNGOS PO'I PHYI LOGS SU BYUNG BA CHOS CAN,
DNGOS PO LAS DNGOS SU SKYES PA'I 'BRAS BU MA YIN PAR THAL,
DNGOS PO LAS DNGOS SU SKYES PA DANG DUS MNYAM DU BYUNG BA
YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree to your original statement: a working thing as it will
be the moment after it is a result corresponding to that
which has grown directly from the working thing.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement, [and say that a working thing as it
will be the moment after it is a result corresponding to that which has
grown directly from the working thing.]

Consider a working thing as it will be the moment after it.
It is not a result corresponding to that which has grown directly from the
working thing,
Because it is something which occurs at the same time as that which has grown
directly from the working thing.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DNGOS PO'I DNGOS 'BRAS
DANG DUS MNYAM DU SKYES PA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a working thing as it will be the moment
after it is something which occurs at the same time as that
which has grown directly from the working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing as it will be the
moment after it, is something which occurs at the same time as that which
has grown directly from the working thing].

Consider this same thing.
It is so [something which occurs at the same time as that which has grown
directly from the working thing],
Because it is something which grows at the same time as the direct result of the
working thing.

DER THAL, DNGOS PO'I PHYI LOGS SU BYUNG BA GRUB NA, DNGOS PO'I

DNGOS 'BRAS MA SKYES PA'I DUS KYANG MED, DNGOS PO'I DNGOS
'BRAS GRUB NA, DNGOS PO'I PHYI LOGS SU BYUNG BA MA SKYES PA'I
DUS KYANG MED PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a working thing as it will be the moment
after it is something which grows at the same time as the
direct result of the working thing.]

It is so [something which grows at the same time as the direct result of the
working thing],

Because (1) there is no point in time where the working thing as it will be the
moment after it has already occurred, but where the direct result of the
working thing has yet to grow; and (2) neither is there any point in time
where the direct result of a working thing has already occurred, but where
the working thing as it will be the moment after it has yet to grow.

KHA CIG NA RE, BUM PA'I RGYU YIN NA, BUM PA'I NYER LEN YIN PAS
KHYAB ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything which is the cause of a water pitcher is always a material
cause of the water pitcher.

BUM PA'I RGYUR GYUR BA'I SKYES BU CHOS CAN, BUM PA'I NYER LEN
YIN PAR THAL, BUM PA'I RGYU YIN PA'I PHYIR, KHYAB PA KHAS,

Consider an individual who acts as a cause for a water pitcher.

So is he then a material cause of the water pitcher?

Because he is a cause for the water pitcher.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, BUM PA'I LHAN CIG BYED
RKYEN YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that an individual who acts as a cause for a water pitcher is a cause for the water pitcher.]

Suppose you say that it's incorrect [to say that an individual who acts as a cause for a water pitcher is a cause for the water pitcher].

Consider this same person.

He is so [a cause for the water pitcher],

Because he is a contributing factor for the water pitcher.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, BUM PA RANG GI LHAN CIG
BYED 'BRAS RANG GI RDZAS RGYUN MA YIN PAR GTZO BOR SKYED
BYED YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that an individual who acts as a cause for a water pitcher is a contributing factor for the water pitcher.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that an individual who acts as a cause for a water pitcher is a contributing factor for the water pitcher].

Consider this same person.

He is so [a contributing factor for the water pitcher],

Because he is something which gives rise to a result of his where he is contributing to its creation, and he is making this contribution in a way where he is not bringing about this result primarily as a continuation of the same material.

RTZA BAR 'DOD NA, BUM PA'I RGYUR GYUR PA'I SKYES BU CHOS CAN,
BUM PA'I NYER LEN MA YIN PAR THAL, BUM PA RANG GI RDZAS
RGYUN DU GTZO BOR SKYED BYED MA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree to your original statement: an individual who acts as a cause for a water pitcher is a material cause of the water pitcher.]

Consider an individual who acts as a cause for a water pitcher.

It isn't so the case, the he is a material cause for the pitcher,

Because he is not bringing about this result primarily as a continuation of the same material.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, KHYOD KYI RDZAS RGYUN
PHYI MAR GYUR PA'I BUM PA MED PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that he is not bringing about this result
primarily as a continuation of the same material.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that he is not bringing about this
result primarily as a continuation of the same material].

Consider this same person.

It is so true, [that he is not bringing about this result primarily as a continuation
of the same material],

Because there exists no water pitcher which is a continuation of his same
material.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, KHYOD GANG ZAG YIN PA'I
PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that there exists no water pitcher which is a
continuation of his same material].

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that there exists no water pitcher
which is a continuation of his same material].

Consider this same person.

It is so true, [to say that there exists no water pitcher which is a continuation of
his same material],

Because he is a person.

KHA CIG NA RE, BUM PA'I RGYU YIN NA, BUM PA'I LHAN CIG BYED
RKYEN YIN PAS KHYAB ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything which is the cause of a water pitcher is always a
contributing factor for the water pitcher.

BUM PA'I RGYUR GYUR PA'I 'JIM PA CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DE'I PHYIR,
KHYAB PA KHAS,

Consider the clay which acts as a cause for a water pitcher.
So is it then [a contributing factor for the water pitcher]?
Because it is [a cause of the water pitcher].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, BUM PA KHYOD KYI 'BRAS BU
YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that the clay which acts as a cause for a water
pitcher is a cause of the water pitcher.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the clay which acts as a cause for
a water pitcher is a cause of the water pitcher].

Consider this same thing.
It is so [a cause of the water pitcher],
Because the water pitcher is its result.

MA GRUB NA, BUM PA CHOS CAN, KHYOD RANG GI RGYUR GYUR PA'I
'JIM PA'I 'BRAS BU YIN PAR THAL, KHYOD KYI RGYUR GYUR PA'I 'JIM PA
YOD PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a water pitcher is a result of the cause of
a water pitcher.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a water pitcher is a result of the
clay which acts as a cause for the water pitcher].

Consider a water pitcher.
It is so a result of the clay which acts as its cause,
Because there does exist clay which acts as its cause.

RTZA BAR 'DOD NA, DE CHOS CAN, BUM PA'I LHAN CIG BYED RKYEN

MA YIN PAR THAL, BUM PA'I NYER LEN YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree to your original statement: the clay which acts as a cause for a water pitcher is a contributing factor for the water pitcher.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement, [saying that the clay which acts as a cause for a water pitcher is a contributing factor for the water pitcher].

Consider this same thing.

It is not so, [that it acts as a contributing factor for the water pitcher],
Because it is the material cause for the water pitcher.

KHA CIG NA RE, RGYU YIN NA, NYER LEN YIN PAS KHYAB ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything which is a cause is always a material cause.

MAR ME SKAD CIG THA MA CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DE'I PHYIR, KHYAB
PA KHAS,

Consider the flame of a butter lamp at the last instant of its existence.
So is it then [a material cause]?
Because it is [a cause].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DNGOS PO YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that the flame of a butter lamp at the last
instant of its existence is a cause.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the flame of a butter lamp at the
last instant of its existence is a cause].

Consider this same thing.
It is so [a cause],
Because it is a working thing.

RTZA BAR 'DOD NA, MAR ME SKAD CIG THA MA CHOS CAN, NYER LEN
MA YIN PAR THAL, RANG GI NYER 'BRAS RANG GI RDZAS RGYUN PHYI
MAR GTZO BOR SKYED BYED MA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree with your original statement: the flame of a butter
lamp at the last instant of its existence is a material cause.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement, [saying that the flame of a butter
lamp at the last instant of its existence is a material cause].

Consider the flame of a butter lamp at the last instant of its existence.
It is so true, that it is not a material cause,
Because it does not bring about a material result of it that is primarily a
continuation of the same material.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, KHYOD KYI RDZAS RGYUN
PHYI MA MED PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that the flame of a butter lamp at the last
instant of its existence does not bring about a material result
of it that is primarily a continuation of the same material.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the flame of a butter lamp at the
last instant of its existence does not bring about a material result of it that
is primarily a continuation of the same material].

Consider this same thing.
It is so true, [that it does not bring about a material result of it that is primarily a
continuation of the same material,]
Because there is no later continuation of this same material.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, KHYOD RDZAS RGYUN CHAD
KHA MA'I DNGOS PO YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that there is no later continuation of this same

material.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that there is no later continuation of this same material].

It is so true, [that there is no later continuation of this same material],
Because this flame is a working thing at the point where the continuation of the same material is about to be cut off.

KHA CIG NA RE, GRUB BDE GCIG YIN NA, GRUB BDE RDZAS GCIG YIN
PAS KHYAB ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If two things are the same in the sense of being co-occurring, then they are always the same in the sense that to be one is to automatically be the other.

TZAN DAN GYI KHA DOG DANG , TZAN DAN GYI DRI GNYIS CHOS CAN,
DER THAL, DE'I PHYIR, KHYAB PA KHAS,

Consider the two of the color of a piece of sandalwood and the smell of a piece of sandalwood.

So are they then [the same in the sense that to be one is to automatically be the other]?

Because they are [the same in the sense of being co-occurring].

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, KHYOD GNYIS GRUB PA DUS
MNYAM, GNAS PA DUS MNYAM, 'JIG PA DUS MNYAM PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that the two of the color of piece of sandalwood and the smell of a piece of sandalwood are the same in the sense of being co-occurring.]

Consider these same things.

They are so [the same in the sense of being co-occurring],

Because they come about at the same time, they stay at the same time, and they

stop at the same time.

KHYAB STE DE GRUB BDE GCIG PA'I DON YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow,
Because this is what it means to be "co-occurring."

RTZA BAR 'DOD NA, TZAN DAN GYI DRI DANG , TZAN DAN KYI KHA
DOG GNYIS CHOS CAN, GRUB BDE RDZAS GCIG MA YIN PAR THAL,
RDZAS GCIG MA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree to your original statement: the two of the color of a
piece of sandalwood and the smell of a piece of sandalwood
are the same in the sense that to be one is to automatically be
the other.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement, [saying that the two of the color of
a piece of sandalwood and the smell of a piece of sandalwood are the
same in the sense that to be one is to automatically be the other].

It is not so, that they are the same in the sense that to be one is to automatically
be the other,
Because they are not things that are such that to be one is to automatically be the
other.

MA GRUB NA, TZAN DAN GYI DRI DANG , TZAN DAN GYI KHA DOG
GNYIS CHOS CAN, RDZAS GCIG MA YIN PAR THAL, NGO BO SO SO BAR
SKYES PA'I CHOS YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that the two of the color of a piece of
sandalwood and the smell of a piece of sandalwood are not
things which are such that to be one is to automatically be
the other.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the two of the color of a piece of
sandalwood and the smell of a piece of sandalwood are not things which
are such that to be one is to automatically be the other].

Consider the two of the smell of a piece of sandalwood and the color of a piece of sandalwood.

It is so true that they are not things which are such that to be one is to automatically be the other,

Because they are existing things which come about in such a way that to be one is not to automatically be the other.

KHA CIG NA RE, RDZAS RIGS GCIG YIN NA, RDZAS GCIG YIN PAS KHYAB ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Any things which are such that to be one is to automatically be of the same material type as the other are also always such that to be one is to automatically be the other.

NYER LEN NAS RDOG GCIG LAS SKYES PA'I NAS 'BRU CHE CHUNG GNYIS CHOS CAN, RDZAS GCIG PA YIN PAR THAL, RDZAS RIGS GCIG YIN PA'I PHYIR, KHYAB PA KHAS,

Consider the two of a larger grain and a smaller grain of barley that grow from a material cause which is a single piece of barley.

So are they then such that to be one is to automatically be the other?

Because they are such that to be one is to automatically be of the same material type as the other.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, RANG GI NYER LEN GCIG LAS SKYES PA'I THA DAD PA'I 'DUS BYAS YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that the two of a larger grain and a smaller grain of barley that grow from a material cause which is a single piece of barley are such that to be one is to automatically be of the same material type as the other.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the two of a larger grain and a smaller grain of barley that grow from a material cause which is a single piece of barley are such that to be one is to automatically be of the same material type as the other].

Consider these same things.

They are so [such that to be one is to automatically be of the same material type as the other],

Because they are produced things which are separate, and which have each grown from the same thing that provided their material cause.

KHYAB STE, RDZAS RIGS GCIG MI GCIG GI DON, RANG GI NYER LEN
GCIG MI GCIG LA BYED DGOS PA'I PHYIR TE, RDZAS RIGS GCIG MI GCIG
GI DON BSHAD TSUL YOD PA'I PHYIR,

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow,

Because the question of whether two things are such that to be one is to automatically be of the same material type as the other is something you must decide by determining whether they have each grown from the same thing that provided their material cause.

RTZA BAR 'DOD NA, DE GNYIS CHOS CAN, RDZAS GCIG MA YIN PAR
THAL, NGO BO GCIG PAR SKYES PA'I CHOS MA YIN PA'I PHYIR TE, NGO
BO THA DAD YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree to your original statement: a larger grain and a smaller grain of barley that grow from a material cause which is a single piece of barley are such that to be one is to automatically be the other.]

Suppose you agree with our original statement, [saying that a larger grain and a smaller grain of barley that grow from a material cause which is a single piece of barley are such that to be one is to automatically be the other].

Consider these same two things.

It is not so, [that they are such that to be one is to automatically be the other],

Because they are not existing objects which come about in such a way that to be

one is to be the other;
And this is true because they are such that to be one is not to be the other.

KHA CIG NA RE, RIGS GCIG YIN NA, BDAG NYID GCIG YIN PAS KHYAB
ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Whenever things are of the same type, they are also always such
that to be one is to automatically be the other.

RTZA DKAR NAG GNYIS CHOS CAN, BDAG NYID GCIG YIN PAR THAL,
RIGS GCIG YIN PA'I PHYIR, KHYAB PA KHAS,

Consider the two of the darker and lighter channels of the body.
So are they then such that to be one is to automatically be the other?
Because they are of the same type.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, LDOG PA RIGS GCIG YIN PA'I
PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that the two of the darker and lighter
channels of the body are of the same type.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct to say [that the two of the darker and lighter
channels of the body are of the same type].

Consider these same things.
They are so [of the same type],
Because they are of the same general type.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, GANG ZAG GANG GIS YID
GTAD PAS MTHONG TZAM NYID NAS 'DI DANG 'DI 'DRA'O SNYAM PA'I

BLO NGANG GI SKYED NUS PA'I CHOS YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that they are of the same general type.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say they are of the same general type].

They are so [of the same general type],

Because they are existing things that fit the following description: they give the immediate, natural impression of "This thing is similar to the other," to anyone who focuses upon them.

KHYAB STE, LDOG PA RIGS GCIG GI DON YOD PA'I PHYIR,

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow,

Because there does exist something we mean when we say that a number of things are of the same general type.

RTZA BAR 'DOD NA, DE CHOS CAN, BDAG NYID GCIG MA YIN PAR THAL, NGO BO THA DAD YIN PA'I PHYIR TE, PHAN TSUN 'BREL MED DON GZHAN YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree to your original statement: the two of the darker and lighter channels of the body are such that to be one is to automatically be the other.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement, [saying that the two of the darker and lighter channels of the body are such that to be one is to automatically be the other].

Consider these same things.

They are not so that to be one is to automatically be the other,

Because they are things such that to be one is not to automatically be the other;

And this is because they are completely separate objects, neither of which shares any relationship with the other.

KHA CIG NA RE, DNGOS PO'I NYER LEN GYI 'BRAS BU YIN NA, DNGOS PO'I NYER 'BRAS YIN PAS KHYAB ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything which is a result of the material of a working thing is always a material result of the working thing.

DNGOS PO CHOS CAN, DNGOS PO'I NYER 'BRAS YIN PAR THAL, DNGOS PO'I NYER LEN GYI 'BRAS BU YIN PA'I PHYIR, KHYAB PA KHAS,

Consider a working thing.

So is it then a material result of the working thing?

Because it is a result of the material of a working thing.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it did necessarily follow.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, RANG GI NYER LEN GYI 'BRAS BU YIN PAR THAL, KHYOD KYI NYER LEN DE, KHYOD KYI RGYU YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is the result of the material of a working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing is the result of the material of a working thing].

Consider this same thing.

It is so the result of the material of a working thing,

Because the material from which it came was its cause.

RTZA BAR 'DOD NA, DE CHOS CAN, DNGOS PO'I NYER 'BRAS MA YIN PAR THAL, DNGOS PO'I 'BRAS BU MA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree with your original statement: a working thing is a material result of the working thing.]

Suppose you agree with our original statement, [saying that a working thing is a material result of the working thing].

Consider this same thing.

It is not so, the material result of the working thing,
Because it is not a result of the working thing.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, KHYOD KHYOD KYI 'BRAS BU MA YIN PAR
THAL, BDAG MED YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is not a result of the
working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing is not a result of
the working thing].

It is so not its own result,
Because it is a thing which has no self-nature.

GNYIS PA RANG GI LUGS LA, RGYU'I MTSAN NYID YOD DE, SKYED BYED
DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR, RGYU 'BRAS BU DNGOS PO GSUM DON

Here next is the second part, where we present our own position. There does
exist a definition of a cause, because it is the following:

Anything which brings about something else.

"Cause," "result," and "working thing" all refer to the same thing.

GCIGDNGOS PO'I RGYU'I MTSAN NYID YOD DE, DNGOS PO'I SKYED BYED
DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR TE, DNGOS PO YIN NA, KHYOD KYI SKYED BYED
KHYOD KYI RGYU'I MTSAN NYID YIN PAS KHYAB PA'I PHYIR,

There does exist a definition of the cause of a working thing, because it is the
following:

Anything which brings about a working thing.

And this is true because, whenever something is a working thing, the definition

of its cause is always "the thing which brings it about."

DNGOS PO'I RGYU LA DBYE NA GNYIS YOD DE, DNGOS PO'I DNGOS RGYU DANG , DNGOS PO'I BRGYUD RGYU GNYIS YOD PA'I PHYIR,

Causes for working things can be divided into two kinds: direct causes for working things and indirect causes for working things.

DNGOS PO'I DNGOS RGYU'I MTSAN NYID YOD DE, DNGOS PO'I DNGOS SU SKYED BYED DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR, MTSAN GZHI YOD DE, DNGOS PO'I SNGA LOGS SU BYUNG BA DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

There does exist a definition for the direct cause of a working thing, because it is the following:

Anything which brings about a working thing directly.

There does exist a classical example of this kind of cause, because it is the following:

A working thing as it was the moment before it.

DNGOS PO'I BRGYUD RGYU'I MTSAN NYID YOD DE, DNGOS PO'I BRGYUD NAS SKYED BYED DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR, MTSAN GZHI YOD DE, DNGOS PO'I SNGA LOGS SU BYUNG BA'I SNGA LOGS SU BYUNG BA DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR, DES DNGOS PO THAMS CAD KYI DNGOS RGYU DANG BRGYUD RGYU LA RIGS 'GRE,

There does exist a definition for the indirect cause of a working thing, because it is the following:

Anything which brings about a working thing indirectly.

There does exist a classical example of this kind of cause, because it is the following:

A working thing as it was the moment before the working thing as it was the moment before it.

These same patterns apply to the direct and indirect causes of all kinds of

working things.

YANG DNGOS PO'I RGYU LA DBYE NA, GNYIS YOD DE, DNGOS PO'I NYER
LEN DANG DNGOS PO'I LHAN CIG BYED RKYEN GNYIS YOD PA'I PHYIR,

Causes for working things can also be divided into another two types, which are (1) material causes for working things and (2) contributing factors for working things.

DNGOS PO'I NYER LEN GYI MTSAN NYID YOD DE, DNGOS PO RANG GI
RDZAS RGYUN DU GTZO BOR SKYED BYED DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,
MTSAN GZHI YOD DE, DNGOS PO'I RGYUR GYUR PA'I BYAS PA DE DE YIN
PA'I PHYIR,

There does exist a definition for the material cause of a working thing, because it is the following:

Anything that brings about a working thing primarily as a continuation of the same material.

There does exist a classical example of this kind of cause, because it is the following: the thing which is made and which acts as a cause for a working thing, [meaning here the working thing as it was the moment before—such as clay for a pot].

DNGOS PO'I LHAN CIG BYED RKYEN GYI MTSAN NYID YOD DE, DNGOS
PO RANG GI RDZAS RGYUN MA YIN PAR RDZAS SU GTZO BOR SKYED
BYED DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR, MTSAN GZHI YOD DE, DNGOS PO'I RGYUR
GYUR PA'I GANG ZAG DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

There does exist a definition of the contributing factor for a working thing, because it is the following:

Anything that brings about a working thing, but not primarily as a continuation of the same material.

There does exist a classical example of this kind of cause, because it is the following: a person who acts as a cause for a particular working thing; [such as a potter for a pot].

'BRAS BU'I MTSAN NYID YOD DE, BSKYED BYA DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

There does exist a definition of a result, because it is the following:

Something which is brought about.

DNGOS PO'I 'BRAS BU'I MTSAN NYID YOD DE, DNGOS PO'I BSKYED BYA DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR, MTSAN GZHI YOD DE, DNGOS PO'I PHYI LOGS SU BYUNG BA DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

There does exist a definition of a result of a working thing, because it is the following:

Something which is brought about by a working thing.

There does exist a classical example of this kind of result, because it is the following:

A working thing as it will be the moment after it.

DNGOS PO'I 'BRAS BU LA DBYE NA GNYIS YOD DE, DNGOS PO'I DNGOS 'BRAS DANG DNGOS PO'I BRGYUD 'BRAS GNYIS YOD PA'I PHYIR,

Results of working things can be divided into two different types: direct results of working things and indirect results of working things.

DNGOS PO'I DNGOS 'BRAS KYI MTSAN NYID YOD DE, DNGOS PO'I DNGOS SU BSKYED BYA DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR, MTSAN GZHI YOD DE, DNGOS PO'I PHYI LOGS SU BYUNG BA DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

There does exist a definition for the direct result of a working thing, because it is the following:

Something which is brought about by a working thing directly.

There does exist a classical example of this same result, because it is the following:

A working thing as it will be the moment after it.

DNGOS PO'I BRGYUD 'BRAS KYI MTSAN NYID YOD DE, DNGOS PO'I BRGYUD NAS BSKYED BYA DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR, MTSAN GZHI YOD DE, DNGOS PO'I PHYI LOGS SU BYUNG BA'I PHYI LOGS SU BYUNG BA DE DE YIN PA'I PHYIR, DES DNGOS PO GZHAN GYI DNGOS 'BRAS DANG BRGYUD 'BRAS LA RIGS 'GRE,

There does exist a definition for the indirect result of a working thing, because it is the following:

Something which is brought about by a working thing indirectly.

There does exist a classical example of this same result, because it is the following:

A working thing as it will be the moment after the working thing as it will be the moment after it.

These same patterns apply to the direct and indirect results of all kinds of working things.



GSUM PA RTZOD SPONG LA, KHA CIG NA RE, DNGOS PO'I NYER LEN MED PAR THAL, DNGOS PO'I SNGA LOGS SU BYUNG BA DE DE MA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

Here is the third major part in our presentation, which is where we eliminate our opponents' rebuttal.

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

So is it then the case that there exist no material causes for working things at all? Because it is the case that a working thing as it was the moment before it is no such cause.

MA GRUB NA, DNGOS PO'I SNGA LOGS SU BYUNG BA CHOS CAN, DNGOS PO'I NYER LEN MA YIN PAR THAL, KHYOD DNGOS POR 'GYUR NGES MA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a working thing as it was the moment before it is not a material cause for it.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing as it was the moment before it is not a material cause for it].

Consider a working thing as it was the moment before it.
It is so true, that it is no material cause for the working thing,
Because there is no certainty that it will become the working thing.

MA GRUB NA, DNGOS PO'I SNGA LOGS SU BYUNG BA CHOS CAN,
DNGOS POR 'GYUR NGES MA YIN PAR THAL, DNGOS POR GYUR ZIN PA'I
PHYIR, ZER NA MA KHYAB,

[It's not correct to say that there is no certainty that a working thing as it was the moment before it will become the working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that there's no certainty that a working thing as it was the moment before it will become the working thing].

Consider a working thing as it was the moment before it.
It is so true, that there's no certainty that a working thing as it was the moment before it will become the working thing,
Because it has already become the working thing.

Our answer to this is, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

MA GRUB NA, DNGOS PO'I SNGA LOGS SU BYUNG BA CHOS CAN,
DNGOS POR GYUR ZIN PAR THAL, DNGOS PO YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that a working thing as it was the moment before it has already become the working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing as it was the moment before it has already become the working thing].

Consider a working thing as it was the moment before it.
It has so already become the working thing,
Because it is a working thing.

KHA CIG NA RE, KA BUM GNYIS CHOS CAN, KHYOD KYI NYER LEN YOD
PAR THAL, KHYOD DNGOS PO YIN PA'I PHYIR, KHYAB PA KHAS,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.
It is so true, that they have their material causes,
Because they are working things.

Remember, you already agreed that it follows.

'DOD NA, KA BUM GNYIS CHOS CAN, KHYOD DU 'GYUR NGES YOD PAR
THAL, KHYOD KYI NYER LEN YOD PA'I PHYIR, RTAGS KHAS,

[We agree that the two of a pillar and a water pitcher have their material causes.]

Suppose you agree [that the two of a pillar and a water pitcher
have their material causes].

Consider the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.
So is it then the case, that there is something which will with
certainty become them?
Because they have their material causes.

Remember, you have agreed to our statement [that the two of a
pillar and a water pitcher have their material causes].

'DOD NA, KA BUM GNYIS CHOS CAN, KHYOD KYI YIN PA YOD PAR
THAL, KHYOD DU 'GYUR NGES YOD PA'I PHYIR ZER NA, GONG DU MA
KHYAB,

Suppose you agree [that it is the case that there are things which
will with certainty become them.]

Consider the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.
So is there then a thing which is them?
Because there are things which will with certainty become them.

To this we answer: "We respond 'It doesn't necessarily follow' to the last one."

DNGOS PO YIN NA, RANG GI RGYU'I 'BRAS BU YIN PAS KHYAB, BYAS PA
LA KHO NA RE, RANG GI RGYU CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DE'I PHYIR ZER
NA,

We have stated that, if something is a working thing, then it is always a result of
its cause. Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim concerning
this statement:

Consider "its cause."
So is it then a result of its cause?
Because it is a working thing.

RTAGS MA GRUB STE, RANG GI RGYU MED PA'I PHYIR TE, RANG RTAG
PA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

It's not correct [to say that "its cause" is a working thing],
Because it has no cause;
And this is true because it's an unchanging thing.

KHO NA RE, BUM PA CHOS CAN, RGYU 'BRAS YIN PAR THAL, RGYU
'BRAS GNYIS KA YIN PA'I PHYIR, ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider a water pitcher.
So is it then the cause and the result?
Because it is both a cause and a result.

MA KHYAB STE, BUM PA CHOS CAN, RGYU 'BRAS MA YIN PAR THAL,
THA DAD MA YIN PA'I PHYIR TE, GCIG YIN PA'I PHYIR,

Our answer is, "It doesn't necessarily follow":

Consider a water pitcher.

It is not so, that it is the cause and the result,

Because it is not separate things;

And this is true because it is one thing.

KHA CIG, RTAG PA MA YIN PA'I RGYU YOD PAR THAL, RGYU YIN NA
RTAG PA MA YIN PA'I RGYU YIN PAS KHYAB PA'I PHYIR ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

It is so true, that there exists a cause of what is not unchanging,
Because anything which is a cause is always a cause for what is not
unchanging.

MI 'THAD DE, RGYU YIN NA RTAG PA MA YIN PA'I RGYU MA YIN PAS
KHYAB PA'I PHYIR,

But this is incorrect,

Because nothing which is a cause is ever a cause for what is not unchanging.

DER THAL, GZHI GRUB NA, RTAG PA MA YIN PA'I RGYU MA YIN PAS
KHYAB PA'I PHYIR,

And this is so the case, because nothing which can be established as existing can
ever be a cause for what is not unchanging.

DER THAL, GZHI GRUB NA, RTAG PA MA YIN PA 'BRAS BU MA YIN PAS
KHYAB PA'I PHYIR,

And this is so the case, because it is always true of everything that can be
established as existing that what is not unchanging could never be a result

DER THAL, GZHI GRUB NA, RTAG PA MA YIN PA DNGOS PO MA YIN PAS
KHYAB PA'I PHYIR,

And this is so the case, because it is always true of everything that can be established as existing that what is not unchanging could never be a working thing.

YANG KHO NA RE, DNGOS PO'I RGYU DANG , DNGOS PO'I 'BRAS BU'I
GZHI MTHUN YOD PAR THAL, DNGOS PO'I RGYUR GYUR PA'I DNGOS
PO'I 'BRAS BU YOD PA'I PHYIR ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes once more, and makes the following claim:

Isn't it the case, that there does exist one thing which can be both (1)
the cause of a working thing and (2) a result of the working
thing?

Because there does exist the result of a working thing that serves as
the cause of a working thing.

MA KHYAB STE, DNGOS PO'I RGYUR GYUR PA'I DNGOS PO'I 'BRAS BU
YOD PAR THAL, DNGOS PO'I RGYUR GYUR PA'I DNGOS PO RGYU YIN
PA'I PHYIR, DER THAL, DE DNGOS PO YIN PA'I PHYIR,

To this we answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

It is so by the way true that there does exist the result of a working thing that
serves as the cause of a working thing,

Because the working thing that acts as the cause for a working thing is a cause.

And this is so,

Because it is a working thing.

GZHAN YANG , DNGOS PO'I RGYUR GYUR PA'I DNGOS PO'I 'BRAS BU
YOD PAR THAL, DNGOS PO DE, DNGOS PO'I RGYUR GYUR PA'I DNGOS
PO'I 'BRAS BU YIN PA'I PHYIR TE, DE DNGOS PO'I RGYUR GYUR PA'I
DNGOS PO'I PHYI LOGS SU BYUNG BA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

It is moreover true that there exists a result of a working thing which acts as the
cause of a working thing,

Because a working thing is a result of a working thing which acts as the cause of
a working thing;

And this is true because it is a working thing as it will be the moment after it which acts as the cause of a working thing.

MA GRUB NA, DNGOS PO CHOS CAN, KHYOD KHYOD KYI RGYUR GYUR PA'I DNGOS PO'I PHYI LOGS SU BYUNG BA YIN PAR THAL, KHYOD 'DUS BYAS YIN PA'I PHYIR,

It's not correct to say that a working thing is a working thing as it will be the moment after it which acts as the cause of a working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing is a working thing as it will be the moment after it which acts as the cause of a working thing.]

Consider a working thing.

It is so [a working thing as it will be the moment after it which acts as its cause],
Because it is a produced thing.

BYAS PA LA, KHO NA RE, DNGOS PO CHOS CAN, KHYOD KYI RGYUR GYUR PA'I KHYOD KYI 'BRAS BU MED PAR THAL, KHYOD KYI RGYU DANG KHYOD KYI 'BRAS BU'I YIN PA MED PA'I PHYIR ZER NA,

Suppose that someone comes and makes the following claim with regard to our last argument:

Consider a working thing.

Isn't it the case that there doesn't even exist a result of it which is its cause?

Because isn't it true that there exists no object which is both its cause and its result?

MA KHYAB STE, DNGOS PO CHOS CAN, KHYOD KYI RGYUR GYUR PA'I KHYOD KYI 'BRAS BU YOD PAR THAL, KHYOD KYI RGYUR GYUR PA'I KHYOD YOD PA GANG ZHIG DE RTAG PA MA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

Our answer here is: "It doesn't necessarily follow":

Consider a working thing.

It is so true, that there exists a result of it which acts as its cause,

Because (1) there exists a version of it which acts as its cause, and (2) this version is not something unchanging.

*Formal logic subject:
The definition of a correct logical statement,
and the three relations*

GNYIS PA RTAGS YANG DAG GI MTSAN NYID BSHAD PA LA, TSUL GSUM YIN PA, DE'I MTSAN NYID, TSUL GSUM GANG ZHE NA, PHYOGS CHOS, RJES KHYAB, LDOG KHYAB GSUM MO, , DE RNAMS SO SO'I MTSAN NYID, MTSAN GZHI, SGRUB BYED KYI RIGS PA DANG GSUM,

A correct reason is defined as:

A reason where the three relationships hold.

What are the three relationships? They are the following three: the relationship between the subject and the reason; the positive necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven; and the reverse necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven. Here now we will give the definition, classical examples, and supporting arguments for each.

DANG PO NI, DE SGRUB KYI SHES 'DOD CHOS CAN SKYON MED KYI STENG DU 'GOD TSUL DANG MTHUN PAR YOD PA NYID DU TSAD MAS NGES PA, DE SGRUB KYI PHYOGS CHOS KYI MTSAN NYID,

Here is the first. The "relationship between the subject and the reason" in any particular proof is defined as holding when:

The reason is ascertained through valid perception to be something that only applies to the subject of the proof—the object about which the opponent entertains his doubt—in the way asserted.

DE SGRUB KYI MTHUN PHYOGS KHO NA LA 'GOD TSUL DANG MTHUN PAR YOD PA NYID DU TSAD MAS NGES PA DE, DE SGRUB KYI RJES KHYAB KYI MTSAN NYID,

The "positive necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven" in any

particular proof is defined as holding when:

The reason is ascertained through valid perception to be something that only applies to the group of similar cases for the proof, in the way asserted.

DE SGRUB KYI DNGOS KYI BSGRUB BYA'I CHOS KYI DON LDOG DANG 'BREL STOBS KYIS DE SGRUB KYI MI MTHUN PHYOGS LA 'GOD TSUL DANG MTHUN PAR MED PA NYID DU TSAD MAS NGES PA DE, DE SGRUB KYI LDOG KHYAB KYI MTSAN NYID,

The "reverse necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven" in any particular proof is defined as holding when:

The reason is ascertained through valid perception to be something that only fails to apply to the group of dissimilar cases for the proof, in the way asserted, due to its relationship to the general type represented by the explicit form of the quality to be proven.

'ON KYANG MTSAN NYID DE DAG NI GO BA GTZO BOR BYAS PA YIN GYI DER NGES PA NI MA YIN TE, SGRA DE SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PAR BYED PA'I MTSAN NYID DE GSUM KA YIN KYANG MTSAN BYA DE RNAMS RE RE NAS MA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

These definitions, however, are only meant to convey the principal sense of what each relationship is; something can, however, satisfy one of them and still not be a correct reason. Sound, for example, satisfies all three of these definitions in a proof that sound is a changing thing, but is none of the things defined by any of the three.

GZHI LA SBYAR TE RGYAS PAR 'GOD NA, SGRA DE KHYOD KYI RTAGS KYIS SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA'I SHES 'DOD CHOS CAN SKYON MED KYANG YIN, KHYOD SGRA DANG PHAN TSUN THA DAD PA'I TSUL GYIS SGRA'I STENG DU 'GOD TSUL DANG MTHUN PAR YOD PA NYID DU TSAD MAS NGES PA, KHYOD SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA'I PHYOGS CHOS YIN PA'I MTSAN NYID,

Suppose we now relate these in more detail, to specific applications. The holding of the "relationship between the subject and the reason in a proof where sound is proven to be a changing thing" can be defined as:

The reason is such that—

- (1) "Sound" provides the subject about which the opponent entertains doubt, in a proof where the particular thing is being used as a reason in the proof that sound is a changing thing; and
- (2) This particular thing is also ascertained by a valid perception only to apply to sound, in the way asserted—while it is also the case that it and sound are separate from each other.

KHYOD KYI RTAGS KYIS SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA'I RTAGS CHOS GNYIS LDAN GYI MTHUN DPE YANG DAG YOD, KHYOD MI RTAG PA LA 'BREL, KHYOD SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA'I MTHUN PHYOGS KHO NA LA 'GOD TSUL DANG MTHUN PAR YOD PA NYID DU TSAD MAS NGES PA KHYOD SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA'I RJES KHYAB YIN PA'I MTSAN NYID,

The reason is such that—

- (1) There does exist a correct "similar example," incorporating both the reason and the quality to be proven;
- (2) The reason is related to "changing thing"; and
- (3) The reason is ascertained through valid perception to be something that only applies to the group of similar cases in the way asserted, in a proof where sound is proven to be an unchanging thing.

KHYOD KYI RTAGS KYIS SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA'I RTAGS CHOS GNYIS DANG LDAN PA'I MI MTHUN DPE YANG DAG YOD, KHYOD MI RTAG PA LA 'BREL, KHYOD DE SGRUB KYI MI MTHUN PHYOGS LA MED PA KHO NAR TSAD MAS NGES PA, KHYOD DE SGRUB KYI LDOG KHYAB YIN PA'I MTSAN NYID,

The holding of the "negative necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven in a proof where sound is proven to be a changing thing" can be defined as:

The reason is such that—

- (1) There does exist a correct "dissimilar example," involving both the reason and the quality to be proven;
- (2) The reason is related to "changing thing"; and
- (3) The reason is ascertained through valid perception to be something that only fails to apply to the group of dissimilar cases in the way asserted, in a proof where sound is proven to be an unchanging thing.

MTSAN GZHI NI, BYAS PA DE BYAS PA'I RTAGS KYIS SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA'I PHYOGS CHOS, RJES KHYAB, LDOG KHYAB GSUM KA YIN,

Here is the classical example. "Something which is made" is an example where, in a proof where "something which is made" is being used as the reason to prove that sound is something changing, all three hold: the relationship between the subject and the reason; the positive necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven; and the negative necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven.

SGRUB BYED KYI RIGS PA NI, BYAS PA CHOS CAN, SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA'I PHYOGS CHOS YIN PAR THAL, MTSAN NYID DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

Here next are the supporting arguments.

Consider "something which is made."

It is so a case where the relationship between the subject and the reason holds, in a proof that sound is something changing,
Because it fits the definition given.

RTZA RTAGS DANG PO MA GRUB NA, SGRA CHOS CAN, BYAS PA'I RTAGS KYIS SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA'I SHES 'DOD CHOS CAN SKYON MED YIN PAR THAL, KHYOD BYAS PA'I RTAGS KYIS SGRA MI RTAGS PAR SGRUB PA'I RTZOD GZHIR BZUNG BA GANG ZHIG, KHYOD BYAS PAR TSAD MAS NGES NAS KHYOD MI RTAG PA YIN MIN LA SHES 'DOD ZHUGS PA'I GANG ZAG SRID PA'I PHYIR,

[The first part of your original statement on this point is not correct:
it is incorrect to say that "sound" provides the subject about
which the opponent entertains doubt, in a proof where "a
thing which is made" is being used as the reason in a proof
that sound is a changing thing.]

Suppose you say that the first part of our original statement is not correct, [which
is to say, it is incorrect to say that "sound" provides the subject about
which the opponent entertains doubt, in a proof where "a thing which is
made" is being used as a reason in the proof that sound is a changing
thing].

Consider sound.

It does so provide the subject about which the opponent entertains doubt, in a
proof where "a thing which is made" is being used as a reason in the proof
that sound is a changing thing,

Because (1) it is considered the basis of contention in a proof where "a thing
which is made" is being used as a reason in the proof that sound is a
changing thing; and (2) it is possible that there exists a person who, once
they have ascertained through valid perception that sound is something
made, still doubts whether or not sound is a changing thing.

DANG PO DER THAL, SGRA CHOS CAN, MI RTAG STE, BYAS PA'I PHYIR
ZHES PA'I SBYOR BA YOD PA'I PHYIR,

[The first part of your reason is not correct.]

The first part of our reason is so correct,
Because the following logical statement does exist:

Consider sound.
It is a changing thing,
Because it is made.

GNYIS PA DER THAL, SGRA BYAS PAR TSAD MAS NGES NAS SGRA MI
RTAG PAR TSAD MAS MA NGES PA'I GANG ZAG YOD PA'I PHYIR,

[The second part of your reason is not correct.]

The second part of our reason is so correct,

Because there do exist people who, once they have ascertained through valid perception that sound is something made, still doubt whether or not sound is a changing thing.

RTZA RTAGS GNYIS PA MA GRUB NA, BYAS PA CHOS CAN, DER THAL, KHYOD SGRA DANG PHAN TSUN THA DAD GANG ZHIG KHYOD SGRA'I STENG DU 'GOD TSUL DANG MTHUN PAR YOD PA NYID DU TSAD MAS NGES PA'I PHYIR,

[The second part of your original statement is not correct: it is not correct to say that "something which is made" is also ascertained by a valid perception only to apply to sound, in the way asserted; and that it is also the case that "something which is made" and sound are separate from each other.]

Suppose you say that the second part of our original statement is not correct.

Consider "something which is made."

It is so [also ascertained by a valid perception only to apply to sound, in the way asserted; and it is so moreover the case that "something which is made" and sound are separate from each other],

Because (1) "something which is made" and sound are separate from each other, and (2) "something which is made" can be ascertained by a valid perception only to apply to sound, in the way asserted.

GNYIS PA DER THAL, KHYOD KYI RTAGS KYIS DE SGRUB KYI 'GOD TSUL YIN 'GOD YIN, SGRA KHYOD YIN, SGRA CHOS CAN GYI STENG DU KHYOD YIN PA'I PHYIR, RTAGS RNAMS SLA,

[The second part of your last reason is not correct: it's not correct to say that "something which is made" can be ascertained by a valid perception only to apply to sound, in the way asserted.]

The second part of our last reason is so true,

Because (1) the way in which the reason is set forth utilizes the verb "is"; (2) sound is something made, and (3) "something which is made" applies to the subject, "sound." All the parts of this reason are easy to accept.

BYAS PA CHOS CAN, KHYOD SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA'I RJES

KHYAB YIN PAR THAL, MTSAN NYID DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

Consider "something which is made."

It is so a case where the positive relationship between the reason and the quality to be proven holds, in a proof that sound is something changing, Because it fits the definition given.

RTZA RTAGS DANG PO DER THAL, BUM PA DE KHYOD KYI RTAGS KYIS SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA'I RTAGS CHOS GNYIS LDAN GYI MTHUN DPE YANG DAG YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[The first part of your original statement on this point is not correct—which is to say, there does not exist a correct "similar example," incorporating both the reason and the quality to be proven, in the proof where "something which is made" is used as the reason in a proof that sound is a changing thing.]

The first part of our original statement on this point is so correct, Because "water pitcher" is a correct "similar example," incorporating both the reason and the quality to be proven, in the proof where "something which is made" is used as the reason in a proof that sound is a changing thing.

MA GRUB NA, BUM PA CHOS CAN, KHYOD BYAS PA'I RTAGS KYIS DE SGRUB KYI RTAGS CHOS GNYIS LDAN GYI MTHUN DPE YANG DAG YIN PAR THAL, KHYOD BYAS PA'I RTAGS KYIS DE SGRUB KYI MTHUN DPER BZUNG BA GANG ZHIG, SGRA'I STENG DU BYAS NA MI RTAG PAS KHYAB PA TSAD MAS MA NGES PA'I SNGA ROL DU KHYOD KYI STENG DU BYAS NA MI RTAG PAS KHYAB PA TSAD MAS NGES PA'I DE SGRUB KYI PHYI RGOL YANG DAG YOD PA'I PHYIR TE, DE BYAS PA'I BYE BRAG YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that "water pitcher" is a correct "similar example," incorporating both the reason and the quality to be proven, in the proof where "something which is made" is used as the reason in a proof that sound is a changing thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that "water pitcher" is a correct "similar example," incorporating both the reason and the quality to be proven, in the proof where "something which is made" is used as the

reason in a proof that sound is a changing thing].

Consider a water pitcher.

It is so a correct similar example, incorporating both the reason and the quality to be proven, in the proof where "something which is made" is used as the reason in a proof that sound is a changing thing,

Because (1) it can be considered a similar example in the proof where "something which is made" is used as the reason in a proof that sound is a changing thing; and (2) there does exist a correct opponent for the particular proof who—before he ascertains with valid perception that the fact that "something which is made must always be something which is changing" applies to sound—has already ascertained, with valid perception, that the fact that "something which is made must always be something which is changing" applies to it [that is, to the similar example: a water pitcher].

DANG PO DER THAL, SGRA CHOS CAN, MI RTAG STE, BYAS PA'I PHYIR,
DPER NA BUM PA BZHIN ZHES PA'I SBYOR BA YOD PA'I PHYIR,

[The first part of your last reason is not correct.]

The first part of our last reason is so correct,
Because the following logical statement does exist:

Consider sound.

It is a changing thing,

Because it is made.

It's like, for example, a water pitcher.

GNYIS PA MA GRUB NA, SHES BYA CHOS CAN, DER THAL, SGRA MI
RTAG PAR TSAD MAS MA NGES PA'I SNGA ROL DU BUM PA MI RTAG
PAR TSAD MAS NGES PA'I DE SGRUB KYI PHYI RGOL YANG DAG YOD
PA'I PHYIR, SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA'I PHYI RGOL YANG DAG YOD
PA'I PHYIR, SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA'I PHYI RGOL YANG DAG DE
DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[The second part of your reason is not correct.]

Suppose you say that the second part of our reason is not correct.

Consider all knowable things.

There does so [exist a correct opponent for the particular proof who—before he ascertains with valid perception that the fact that "something which is made must always be something which is changing" applies to sound—has already ascertained, with valid perception, that the fact that "something which is made must always be something which is changing" applies to it (that is, to the similar example: a water pitcher),.

Because there does exist a correct opponent for the particular proof who—before he ascertains with valid perception that the fact that "something which is made must always be something which is changing" applies to sound—has already ascertained, with valid perception, the fact that a water pitcher is a changing thing.

And this is true because there does exist a correct opponent for the proof that sound is a changing thing.

And this is true because what it means to be a correct opponent for the proof that sound is a changing thing is exactly what we just mentioned.

DE SGRUB KYI PHYI RGOL YANG DAG DES SGRA MI RTAG PAR TSAD
MAS MA NGES PA GANG ZHIG, DE BUM PA MI RTAG PAR TSAD MAS
NGES PA'I GANG ZAG YIN PA'I PHYIR, RTAGS GNYIS CHOS CAN GYIS
SGRUB,

And this is true because a correct opponent for this particular proof is a person who (1) has not yet ascertained, with a valid perception, that sound is something changing; and who (2) has already ascertained, with a valid perception, that a water pitcher is a changing thing.

The two points of the reason are established by the very subject at hand.

RTZA RTAGS GNYIS PA DER THAL, KHYOD MI RTAG PA LA BDAG GCIG
TU 'BREL BA'I PHYIR,

[The second part of your original statement is incorrect: the reason
is not related to "changing thing."]

The second part of our original statement is so correct,
Because the reason is related to "changing thing" in such a way that to be the
reason is to automatically be a changing thing.

RTZA RTAGS GSUM PA DER THAL, KHYOD KYI RTAGS KYIS DE SGRUB
KYI 'GOD TSUL YIN 'GOD GANG ZHIG, SGRUB TSUL YIN SGRUB YIN,

KHYOD MI RTAG PA YIN, KHYOD YIN NA, MI RTAG PA YIN DGOS PA'I
PHYIR,

[The third part of your original statement is incorrect: the reason is
not ascertained through valid perception to be something
that only applies to the group of similar cases in the way
asserted, in a proof where sound is proven to be an
unchanging thing.]

The third part of our original statement is so correct,
Because (1) the proof in which "something made" appears as a reason is one
where "is" is used as the verb with the reason; and (2) the verb used with
the quality to be proven is "is," (3) the reason given is a changing thing,
and (4) anything which is something made is automatically a changing
thing.

DANG PO SLA, GNYIS PA DER THAL, KHYOD KYI RTAGS KYIS DE SGRUB
KYI SGRUB TSUL YIN SGRUB DANG , YOD GRUB GANG RUNG GANG
ZHIG, PHYI MA MA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

The first point is easy.
The second is so true,
Because (1) it appears as a reason in a proof where the verb used with the quality
to be proven could have been either "is" or "exists," and (2) here it is not
the latter.

DANG PO DER THAL, KHYOD DE SGRUB KYI RTAGS SU BKOD PA'I PHYIR,

[The first of these two points is not correct: it's not correct to say
that "it is something made" appears as a reason in a proof
where the verb used with the quality to be proven could
have been either "is" or "exists."]

The first of the two points is so true,
Because it has been set forth as a reason in the proof.

GNYIS PA MA GRUB NA, BYAS PA SGRA MI RTAG PAR YOD PAR SGRUB
PA'I MTHUN PHYOGS LA KHYAB BYED DU 'JUG PA'I RTAGS YIN PAR
THAL, DE SGRUB KYI MTHUN PHYOGS LA KHYAB BYED DU 'JUG PA'I
RTAGS YOD PA'I PHYIR,

[The second of these two points is not correct: it's not correct to say that here it is not the latter.]

Suppose you say that the second of the two points is not correct.

So is it then the case that "something which is made" is used here as a reason which covers the entire group of similar cases in a proof where "changing things exist" is being proven about sound?

Because there does exist a reason which covers the entire group of similar cases in the particular proof.

'DOD NA, SHES BYA CHOS CAN, BYAS PA YIN PAR THAL, MI RTAG PA YOD PA'I PHYIR,

[I agree to your statement that "something which is made" is used here as a reason which covers the entire group of similar cases in a proof where "changing things exist" is being proven about sound.]

Suppose you agree with our statement.

Consider all knowable things.

So are they then something which is made?

Because changing things exist with them.

RTAGS GSUM PA DER THAL, BYAS PA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[The third part of your reason above is incorrect: the reason given is not a changing thing.]

The third part of our reason above is so correct,

Because the reason given is "something which is made."

RTAGS BZHI PA 'BUD DO,

And we can throw out any objection to the fourth part of our reason, [which states that anything which is something made is automatically a changing thing].

BYAS PA CHOS CAN, SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA'I LDOG KHYAB YIN

PAR THAL, MTSAN NYID DE YIN PA'I PHYIR,

Consider [the reason] "something which is made."

It is so true, that the negative necessity holds with it in a proof that sound is a
changing thing,

Because it fits the given definition.

RTZA RTAGS DANG PO GRUB TE, 'DUS MA BYAS KYI NAM MKHA' DE YIN
PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that it fits the first part of the original
definition; that is, there does not exist a correct "dissimilar
example," involving both the reason and the quality to be
proven.]

It does fit the first part [of the original definition of whether the negative
necessity holds],

Because "empty space, an unproduced thing" is just such an example.

RTZA RTAGS GNYIS PA SGRUB ZIN, RTZA RTAGS GSUM PA GRUB STE, MI
RTAG PA MA YIN PA LA BYAS PA MED PA'I PHYIR,

We have already established that it fits the second part [of the original definition;
that is, the reason ("something made") does relate to "changing thing"].

It does fit the third part [of the original definition; that is, "something which is
made" is ascertained through valid perception to be something that only
fails to apply to the group of dissimilar cases in the way asserted, in a
proof where sound is proven to be an unchanging thing],

Because nothing which is made ever applies to those things which are not
changing.