



Diamond Mountain University

Sacred Classics Translator Program, Winter Term 2006

Name:
Date:
Grade:

Answer Key, Homework, Class 3

1) What claim does some ‘opponent’ make at this part of the text about the compassion that has no focus? Give the Tibetan words used in the text for the ‘opponent’ and ‘to claim’. With respect to the second word, what is implied in the use of this particular verb?

That a person with this kind of compassion is perceiving that the living beings which are the object of its focus have no nature of their own. That is, that one has a state of mind that is simultaneously wishing that the person could be free from their suffering and perceiving that the person lacks any self-nature.

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kachik (‘someone’/the ‘opponent’)

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serwa (to claim, say)

The use of this particular Tibetan verb implies that the claim is mistaken.

2) According to our system, what mistake has the opponent made here? How do we resolve the relevant issue?

The opponent has made the mistake of asserting that the mind can hold its object in disparate ways at the same time. According to our system it is not possible for the mind to hold more than one object in any one instant. So the compassion which focuses on nothing and the compassion that focus on things do not *perceive* that the living beings who are the object of their focus lack any nature of their own or have subtle impermanence etc; but these states of mind do have a *sense* of these respective qualities of living beings.

3) What Scriptural authority does Master Kedrup Tenpa Dargye then present to prove his position? What additional point does the quotation provide?

Master Kedrup Tenpa Dargye quotes from Je Tsongkapa's *The Illumination of the True Thought*. Je Tsongkapa provides the additional point that this sense of the person's subtle impermanence or lack of a self-nature comes from having grasped these qualities in some *prior* perception.

4) How is it that for Arya Bodhisattvas, who are not yet enlightened (but have the compassion that focuses on nothing) and when they are not in the direct perception of emptiness, living beings appear to them as both having *and not* having a true nature of their own?

Objects still appear dualistically to Arya Bodhisattvas who are not yet enlightened (and when not in the direct perception of emptiness) and so living beings who are the focus of their compassion appear to have a nature of their own. However, they also have the sense of living beings as not having a nature of their own because of their prior perception of emptiness.